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ABSTRACT 
This Article jointly examines legal biographies of two landmark First 
Amendment decisions and the Justices who produced them. In The Great 
Dissent (Henry Holt and Co. 2013), Thomas Healy explores Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919), which 
arguably laid the cornerstone for modern American free speech 
jurisprudence. In The Progeny (ABA 2014), Stephen Wermiel and Lee 
Levine explore William J. Brennan’s majority opinion in New York Times 
v. Sullivan (1964) and the development and evolution of its progeny over 
Brennan’s remaining twenty-five years on the Court. The Article then 
explores three ideas: (1) the connections and intersections between these 
watershed opinions and their revered authors, including how Brennan in 
New York Times and its progeny brought to fruit the First Amendment 
seeds that Holmes planted in Abrams; (2) three recent Supreme Court 
decisions that show how deeply both decisions are engrained into the First 
Amendment fabric; and (3) how Brennan took the speech-protective lead in 
many other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
INTRODUCTION 
A short list of the Supreme Court’s most rhetorically powerful and 
influential opinions protecting the freedom of speech necessarily includes 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States 
and Justice William J. Brennan’s 1964 opinion for the Court in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.1 
But these opinions and the Justices who authored them share a more 
substantial connection. Holmes arguably invented modern freedom of 
speech in his Abrams dissent, promoting constitutional primacy for speech 
in matters of public concern and protection for dissenting ideas so they can 
be tested and seek to prevail in the marketplace of ideas. From its birth in 
Abrams, “freedom to express oneself” has become “our preeminent 
constitutional value and a defining national trait.”2 Forty-five years after 
 
1.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Other entries on the list include: Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United, Inc. v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989); the various opinions in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971); the per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion in W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); and Justice 
Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
2.  THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS 
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (2013); see also Ronald K.L. 
Collins, Epilogue: The Long Shadow, in THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE 
AND READER 349, 377 (Ronald K.L. Collins, ed. 2010). 
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Abrams, Brennan’s New York Times opinion represented a Court majority’s 
first full-throated adoption of the idea that speech on public and 
governmental affairs must be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.3 And 
while Brennan implicitly rejected Holmesian ideas about clear and present 
danger, falsely shouting fire, and crowded theatres, he wholeheartedly 
embraced the ideal of broad liberty to criticize government and government 
officials, even in “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp” 
terms.4 New York Times and its progeny demonstrate that Holmes’s dissent 
“continues to influence our thinking about free speech more than any other 
single document.”5 
Two recent books catalogue how each Justice pursued his respective 
jurisprudential landmark. Both are narrative historiographies, telling the 
stories of the cases, Justices, Courts, cultural and legal milieus, and 
deliberative processes leading to the seminal opinions. Both books draw 
from the papers of their subject Justices and their correspondence with 
other Justices, policymakers, intellectuals, opinion makers, and friends. 
In The Great Dissent, Thomas Healy “unravel[s] the mystery” behind 
Abrams and Holmes’s transformation on free speech—how he moved from 
general disinterest in, if not outright hostility towards, broad freedom of 
speech to laying the groundwork for the First Amendment’s uniquely 
prominent place in American constitutional law.6 Healy focuses on a 
seventeen-month period from spring 1918 to fall 1919, in which Holmes 
wrote four major opinions considering First Amendment protection for 
radical (and even criminal) socialist, unionist, and anarchist political speech 
during and just after World War I—three for a unanimous Court rejecting 
the free speech defense, followed by his historic dissent. 
In The Progeny, Lee Levine and Stephen Wermiel explore how 
Brennan established extraordinary free speech immunity from defamation 
liability in New York Times, then spent the next twenty-five years (until his 
1990 retirement) trying to preserve and expand it in the face of shifting 
Court membership, preferences, majorities, and legal and factual contexts. 
They focus on the many permutations of a single free speech issue that 
occupied Brennan’s attention for almost his entire tenure. In fact, Levine 
and Wermiel explain this as the reason for the book. Wermiel and a 
different co-author published a definitive Brennan biography in 2010,7 but 
 
3.  New York Times, 376 U.S. 254; cf. Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 
SUP. CT. REV. 297, 299–300 (describing “distorted” historical understanding by many that the 
expansion of the First Amendment that began with Holmes was an unquestioned victory for the political 
left). 
4.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. 
5.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 7. 
6.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 7. 
7.  SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010). 
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space constraints limited them to only seven pages on New York Times and 
little space to subsequent developments in that doctrinal area. The Progeny 
is the answer to that problem, a way to isolate “Brennan’s role in 
formulating what we now understand to be the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”8 
Abrams and New York Times represent their respective authors’ 
enduring free-speech achievements. Abrams burnished Holmes’s reputation 
as a great, iconic Justice and (along with his Lochner dissent)9 as the great 
dissenter10—although, ironically, Healy argues, Holmes at the time did not 
relish the prospect of dissenting.11 Upon his retirement, Brennan regarded 
New York Times as his greatest judicial accomplishment and he was 
anxious that it be maintained after he left the Court.12 It thus makes sense 
for these books to deep-dive into these special jurisprudential 
achievements. And given the direct line from what Holmes sowed in 
Abrams to what Brennan reaped in New York Times, it is appropriate to 
consider the books, the opinions, and the Justices together. This joint 
consideration is especially well timed. New York Times marked its fiftieth 
anniversary in 2014, prompting several symposia on the case.13 Abrams 
marks its centennial in 2019. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I examines The Great 
Dissent, along with Healy’s companion article in the Journal of Supreme 
Court History.14 Part II examines The Progeny. The next three parts use the 
two books as a starting point to identify and explore broader themes and 
connections between these Justices and these decisions. Part III explores 
connections between the two opinions, the judicial giants who created 
them, and the underlying themes in the two books. Part IV examines three 
recent “progeny” cases that demonstrate the continued vitality of New York 
Times and the First Amendment ideals Holmes and Brennan espoused. Part 
V explores other areas in which Brennan opinions established, or attempted 
to establish, a speech-protective jurisprudence, thus showing that, even had 
Holmes not changed his mind in Abrams, Brennan might have been the 
Justice to lead the First Amendment to a position of constitutional 
prominence. 
 
8.  LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO 
PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN, at xi (2014). 
9.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
10.  Collins, supra note 2, at 352–53; Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 661, 664–65, 681–83 (2012). 
11.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 70. 
12.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 342. 
13.  See Symposium, The Press and the Constitution 50 Years after New York Times v. Sullivan, 
48 GA. L. REV. 691 (2014); Symposium, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014). 
14.  Thomas Healy, The Justice Who Changed His Mind: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the 
Story behind Abrams v. United States, 39 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 35 (2014). 
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I. THE GREAT DISSENT 
In The Great Dissent, Healy tells a seventeen-month story through the 
lens of Holmes, the cast of characters in Holmes’s life, and four cases 
before the Supreme Court. 
Healy begins in June 1918, with Holmes and his wife preparing to 
board a train from Washington, D.C. to their summer home in 
Massachusetts, following completion of October Term 1917. To that point, 
Holmes’s most significant published First Amendment decision had been 
Patterson v. Colorado, in which he insisted that the “main purpose of such 
constitutional provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon 
publications as had been practised by other governments,’ and they do not 
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to 
the public welfare.”15 This view of free speech, associated historically with 
William Blackstone and more recently with the historical work of Leonard 
Levy,16 left the political branches with virtual carte blanche to punish 
speech post-publication for any harm it might cause. And, Healy argues, 
that was consistent with Holmes’s overall, if underdeveloped, 
constitutional vision. Holmes viewed the First Amendment as he viewed 
substantive due process—skeptically, as an unwarranted and usually 
improper effort to limit the power of political majorities to make law and 
public policy and to address social ills. 
In March 1919, Holmes authored three unanimous opinions upholding 
convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 for speech critical of World 
War I, the U.S. role in the war, and the draft. The Espionage Act punished 
willfully obstructing the military draft, causing insubordination in the 
military, or publishing false reports intended to interfere with the war 
effort. In the first case, Schenck v. United States,17 Holmes announced the 
governing legal standard, using rhetoric that has endured as among his 
most famous. First, the “most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”18 
Instead, the 
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
 
15.  Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 
(1915) (affirming conviction for editing material tending to encourage disrespect for law). 
16.  LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). 
17.  249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
18.  Id. at 52. 
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Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree.19 
But, Healy argues, it is not clear what Holmes actually was doing 
here—or whether Holmes himself fully understood. As a standard 
(although not one originating with Holmes20), this sounded more speech-
protective than the prevailing “bad tendency” test. But it also might have 
been mere rhetoric, something for which Holmes had become rather 
infamous. Indeed, the shouting-fire metaphor,21 which the federal 
prosecutor had used during the contemporaneous jury trial of socialist 
Eugene V. Debs,22 soon took on a life of its own. There are good arguments 
that the metaphor is entirely inapt, certainly as applied to political ideas, as 
scholar Ernst Freund argued in 1919.23 Although it endures to this day in 
popular discourse, it ultimately—and fortunately—lost sway in judicial 
discourse.24 
Having announced this potentially more protective legal standard in 
Schenck, Holmes then proceeded to write for a unanimous Court in 
preserving all three convictions in relatively short order, without having to 
restate or elaborate on the constitutional standard. In none of the cases did 
the government show any genuine immediate risk that the speech would 
interfere with the draft or the war. Schenck arose from a leaflet—mailed to 
some draftees—questioning the constitutionality of the draft, encouraging 
readers to write their congressmen and urge repeal of the draft, and 
advising men to register (lawfully) as conscientious objectors.25 Frohwerk 
v. United States arose from a small German-language newspaper 
publishing relatively tame anti-war op-eds and truthful reporting about the 
war and about draft riots.26 Debs v. United States arose from a two-hour 
policy speech by the Socialist Party leader and former presidential 
 
19.  Id. 
20.  Collins, supra note 2, at 234–35. 
21.  Id. at 231–33. 
22.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 268–69. 
23.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 134–35; Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at 14; see also Snyder, supra note 10, at 682–83 (discussing reactions to the 
fire metaphor). See generally Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting Fire in a Theater”: The Life and Times 
of Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181 (2015) (tracing the 
origins and evolution of the fire analogy, concluding that the “central analogy of First Amendment law 
has become an abstract debating point, stripped of immediate relevance or any sense of serious 
danger”). 
24.  Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning” of the First 
Amendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 205 (celebrating that First Amendment analysis no longer focuses 
on “the sterile example of a man falsely yelling fire in a crowded theater”). 
25.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–50 (1919); HEALY, supra note 2, at 82–83, 94–
102. 
26.  Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); HEALY, supra note 2, at 84–85, 102–
03. 
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candidate during the run-up to the 1918 mid-term elections, a speech which 
only briefly mentioned the war or the draft at all.27 
Nothing in Holmes’s analysis in any of the cases sounded in that higher 
clear-and-present danger rhetoric. In Frohwerk, the conviction could be 
upheld because “it [was] impossible to say that it might not have been 
found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath 
would be enough to kindle a flame.”28 Similarly, Debs’ conviction was 
proper simply because his utterances might encourage listeners to obstruct 
recruiting services, even if the general theme of the speech—promoting 
socialism and socialist positions on the eve of democratic elections—was 
protected.29 All of which suggests to Healy that Schenck was largely 
rhetorical. Holmes did not truly create or apply some new speech-
protective test in these cases and, as of spring 1919, “was not yet ready to 
embrace free speech in full.”30 
Eight months later, the Court affirmed another conviction in Abrams v. 
United States.31 This was a prosecution under the Sedition Act of 1918, a 
broader amendment to the 1917 Act that criminalized speech and conduct 
that was “disloyal” or “scurrilous” about the United States’ form of 
government, that encouraged resistance to the war against Germany, or that 
was intended to curtail production of arms.32 Healy describes the 
underlying events in great detail. Abrams and his three co-defendants (all 
Jews of Russian origin) “published” several leaflets by throwing them from 
the roofs of buildings in New York City. The leaflets criticized U.S. 
intervention in the Russian Revolution; called on the “Workers of the 
World” to awake, arise, and put down the enemy of capitalism; and urged 
munitions workers to stop manufacturing bullets that would be used to 
murder those fighting for freedom in Russia. They each were sentenced to 
between fifteen and twenty years in prison.33 After quoting the flyers at 
length, Justice John H. Clarke’s majority opinion insisted that the “plain 
purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, 
disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country 
for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans 
of the government in Europe.”34 At a minimum, the portion of the leaflets 
 
27.  Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); HEALY, supra note 2, at 85–89, 103–04. 
Despite his obvious political notoriety, Debs is never mentioned by name in the opinion. 
28.  Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209. 
29.  Debs, 249 U.S. at 212–13. 
30.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 102. 
31.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
32.  See id. 
33.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 169–81. 
34.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 623. 
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calling for the general strike among munitions workers was sufficient to 
support the convictions on some counts.35 
This time, however, Justice Holmes dissented, along with Louis 
Brandeis. In fewer than 2,500 words, Holmes invented what eventually 
would become the cornerstone of modern free speech doctrine. Healy 
describes Holmes’s drafting process in great detail, although the significant 
pieces of the dissent are well known. There is the call for toleration and 
humility—recognition that suppression of dissenting speech is “perfectly 
logical” when one is certain of one’s ideas, but less so when one recognizes 
that “time has upset many fighting faiths.”36 There is the insistence that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.37 
There is the call for being “eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death.”38 And there is explicit application of the clear and present danger 
idea he launched (although arguably did not apply) in Schenck—the First 
Amendment runs out only when words “so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country.”39 
Healy’s book (and companion article) tries to understand and explain 
the evolution of Holmes’s thinking on the First Amendment between June 
1918 and November 1919. He explores the nature of this groundbreaking 
jurisprudential shift, particularly the intellectual influences that pushed him 
in this new direction. This is a rich and detailed narrative exploration, from 
which several themes emerge. 
The prevailing focus is the roster of people who encouraged and 
influenced Holmes’s change of mind. The first and most famous of these is 
Judge Learned Hand, at the time a judge on the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York. In 1917, Hand had issued a highly 
speech-protective decision (ultimately reversed by the Second Circuit) that 
limited the reach of the Espionage Act with respect to political opinion and 
criticism. Hand expressly declined to allow the Act to reach words that fall 
“within the range of opinion and of criticism . . . within the scope of that 
 
35.  Id. at 623–24. 
36.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
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right to criticise either by temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and 
indecent invective, which is normally the privilege of the individual in 
countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate 
source of authority.”40 More importantly, he insisted that speech could be 
punished only if it can be “thought directly to counsel or advise” unlawful 
action, such as resistance to the war or the draft.41 Rather, to “assimilate 
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is 
to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in 
normal times is a safeguard of free government.”42 
Holmes and Hand met by accident on that train to Massachusetts in 
June 1918, sparking a conversation and exchange of letters in which Hand 
attempted to convince Holmes of the need to tolerate opposing political 
viewpoints.43 Healy shows these efforts as initially unsuccessful, with 
Holmes holding firmly to the idea that society can impose its will on 
individuals, that it possesses and exercises a “sacred right to kill the other 
fellow when he disagrees.”44 Certainly Holmes had not moved by March 
1919, when he wrote Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. 
A second influence was a group of young Washington progressives 
with whom Holmes surrounded himself. These young men admired 
Holmes’s prior dissents that happened to further progressive causes 
(notably Lochner), while Holmes enjoyed the recognition and reverence 
they showed him. Among those joining together in the “House of Truth” 
were Felix Frankfurter, a rising star at Harvard Law School then serving 
several stints in the federal government; journalist Walter Lippmann; the 
editors of The New Republic; and historian, social theorist, and politician 
Harold Laski, an English Jew working as a lecturer at Harvard at the time.45 
Of these, Laski46 emerges as the greatest influence, because their 
relationship is the closest—according to Healy, Holmes saw Laski as the 
son he never had. Despite vast differences in age (Holmes was in his late 
70s at this point, Laski his mid-20s), background, and politics, Laski 
became a Holmes favorite.47 Beyond their visits and exchanges of letters in 
Massachusetts during the summers of 1918 and 1919, Laski urged Holmes 
 
40.  Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 
1917). 
41.  Id. at 540–41. 
42.  Id. at 540. 
43.  The story of that exchange is told from Hand’s perspective, crediting Hand with far more 
influence on Holmes, in Gerald Gunther’s biography of Hand. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: 
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 161–64 (1994); see also Thomas E. Baker, Clear and Present Dangers: The 
Importance of Ideas and the Bowels in the Cosmos, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 485–86 (1999). 
44.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 21. 
45.  Id. at 29–30; Healy, supra note 14, at 28; Snyder, supra note 10, at 664, 670–71. 
46.  Cf. HAROLD J. LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE (1919). 
47.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 30–35. 
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to read progressive thinkers and ideas. Most notable of these was John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, from which Holmes drew the idea (expressed in 
Abrams) of broad distribution of expression as an essential part of the 
search for truth.48 
Holmes also came to appreciate the need for toleration of dissenting 
speech and the threat of intolerance through his friendships with Laski and 
Frankfurter. Throughout 1919, both men faced criticism and threats of 
sanctions for their political speech and activity. Laski was an outspoken 
advocate and supporter of an aborted strike by Boston police officers, 
which lead to calls for his termination from Harvard. Frankfurter was 
responsible for establishing labor policies for the War Department during 
and after World War I; in doing so, he publicly criticized management 
practices and pushed for adoption of progressive ideas such as shorter 
workdays. Those efforts were met with public hostility and similar calls for 
his removal from the Harvard faculty. 
Healy writes that Holmes had little sympathy for the causes that 
Frankfurter or Laski were fighting for or the positions they were taking; his 
sympathy was for his friends. Nevertheless, these incidents illustrated for 
Holmes the potential power of speech. In minimizing the potential harm 
from the leaflets in Abrams, Holmes derided the “surreptitious publishing 
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”49 But in seeing the risk that 
intolerance posed to his beloved friends, Holmes finally recognized the 
need to protect the speech of known and more powerful men espousing 
more important ideas. Holmes, Healy argues, recognized the need to speak 
one’s mind and to allow others to speak theirs, even if one disagreed with 
the viewpoints expressed. 
Interestingly, Healy identifies far less intellectual influence or 
persuasion coming from Holmes’s fellow Justices. He explores Brandeis’s 
role as Holmes’s friend, confidante, and intellectual ally. Brandeis had 
personally and successfully lobbied Holmes (Holmes described it to Laski 
as having been “catspawned”) to dissent in an earlier Espionage Act case.50 
And Brandeis responded immediately and enthusiastically to the circulated 
draft of the Abrams dissent, writing “I join you heartily & gratefully. This 
is fine—very.”51 And Brandeis authored his own dissents, joined by 
Holmes, in two Sedition Act cases decided shortly after Abrams.52 But 
Healy identifies no conversation or consultation between them on 
 
48.  Cf. Collins, supra note 2, at 213 (identifying Mill’s On Liberty as one of several books that 
seem to have informed Holmes’s thinking in Abrams). 
49.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919). 
50.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 70–76. See Baltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593 (1918). 
51.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 214. 
52.  See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Abrams.53 Indeed, Holmes generally disdained conferencing and discussing 
cases with his fellow Justices. 
The strongest lobbying effort within the Court occurred in the other 
direction. On the evening of Friday, November 7, Justices Mahlon Pitney 
and Willis Van Devanter (along with an unknown third Justice) visited 
Holmes at home and urged him to withdraw his dissent. They argued that 
the ongoing national turmoil in fall 1919—labor strife, race riots, political 
tensions, foreign revolutions, President Wilson’s recent stroke—demanded 
that the Court speak in a single voice, so as not to “weaken the country’s 
resolve and give comfort to the enemy.”54 In fact, the visit from the Justices 
occurred the same evening as the infamous Palmer Raids.55 But Holmes 
was unmoved, even by arguments about the Court’s institutional interests, 
something he often respected and protected. Holmes had firmly shifted to a 
position in favor of broad protection for free speech and that trumped 
institutional concerns. 
Following Abrams, Holmes basked in the adulation and gratitude from 
the House of Truth, even if embarrassed by their effusiveness. Among the 
most effusive was Hand, who wrote that, “I am quite confident that 
whether it is avowed or not, in the end your views must prevail, after 
people get over the existing hysteria.”56 While Holmes’s reputation as a 
First Amendment leader largely took hold after his death,57 Abrams stands 
as a significant starting point for that recognition. Which is not to say that 
the praise was universal—John Henry Wigmore wrote a blistering attack 
on the decision, although his long friendship with Holmes caused him to 
avoid referring to any Justice by name.58 
The general praise heaped on the Abrams dissent, then and now, 
obscures an open question—whether Holmes actually changed his views on 
free speech or realized that he might have changed those views. Healy 
explores this in the book and even more so in the companion article. His 
extensive review of the historical record reveals both that Holmes did 
change and the reasons why this remains a subject of debate. 
Part of the problem is the way Holmes wrote his opinions. In 
Patterson, Holmes had squarely adopted the Blackstonian view of free 
speech. In subsequently rejecting that view in Schenck, Holmes only 
 
53.  Those dynamics might have been a product of the architecture of their time. The Court did 
not have a separate building and the Justices did not have chambers at the Court; Holmes worked 
singularly from his home and walked to the Court for arguments. 
54.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 5. 
55.  Id. at 214–15. 
56.  Id. at 221–22. 
57.  Collins, supra note 2, at 352. 
58.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 225–30. 
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acknowledged that the Court “intimated” that view59—a dramatic 
understatement, given that Holmes had written the earlier opinion—without 
overruling the earlier opinion. Similarly, Holmes expressly accepted 
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs as rightly decided,60 despite their apparent 
inconsistency with his position in Abrams. All Holmes would say of Debs 
was that he hated to write the opinion and would have voted to acquit had 
he been a juror on the case, but his hands were tied on the constitutional 
question—again ignoring that he tied those hands with his own opinion in 
Schenck. Holmes ran from his prior opinions, although never explicitly, 
leaving himself room to insist on his own consistency and leaving the 
historical record cloudy.61 
A further problem, Healy shows, is that the outcomes of the cases are 
arguably flipped. The evidence in Abrams was far stronger than in the 
earlier cases—the fliers, had they convinced anyone, explicitly urged a 
general strike of munitions workers that would have interfered with the war 
effort. This contrasts with the “tame” reportage of the German-language 
newspaper in Frohwerk or to Debs’s lengthy stump speech delivered on the 
eve of an election. In other words, if any conviction could possibly be 
constitutionally appropriate in any of these cases, it was in Abrams, the one 
case in which Holmes insisted that the speaker could not be punished. 
These disparate outcomes must indicate that between March and November 
1919, Holmes had a broader change of heart as to what the First 
Amendment does and does not protect and what Congress can and cannot 
legislate against. It also explains why Holmes took pains in Abrams to 
minimize the possible harm from “a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”62 
Holmes’s correspondence is marked by a similar gentility, with no 
writer wanting to acknowledge disagreement or challenge the other. For 
example, Holmes began his second letter to Hand in June 1918 by saying “I 
agree with [Hand’s earlier letter],” then spent the remainder of his missive 
revealing the dramatic intellectual and constitutional distance between 
them.63 Laski studiously avoided disagreeing with the older Holmes 
directly and often rushed to defend him against those who criticized his 
initial free speech opinions. One sharp critic was Ernst Freund, who decried 
Holmes’s Debs opinion in the pages of The New Republic64 (an ironic 
forum, given that the editors were active in the House of Truth). Holmes 
drafted a defensive letter to the editor in response, then sent the letter to 
Laski so he could relay it to the magazine. Although nothing ever became 
 
59.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919). 
60.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
61.  Healy, supra note 14, at 51–52. 
62.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
63.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 56–57. 
64.  Freund, supra note 23, at 14. 
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of that exchange, Laski took Holmes’s side against his critics, even if he 
likely agreed with the critics on the substance of the matter. 
The one error Holmes ever admitted was not Schenck, Frohwerk, or 
Debs, but Patterson. In a 1922 letter to law professor Zachariah Chafee, 
Holmes said he “simply was ignorant” for adhering to the Blackstonian 
view that the First Amendment only prohibited prior restraint but not post-
publication punishment.65 Eight years later, Holmes was similarly 
forthright during oral argument in Near v. Minnesota,66 a challenge to a 
state law permitting courts to declare certain publications a nuisance 
subject to abatement and injunction. When counsel for the state reminded 
Holmes of Patterson, Holmes responded, “I was much younger when I 
wrote that opinion than I am now, Mr. Markham. If I did make such a 
holding, I now have a different view.”67 Even then, of course, Holmes was 
coy as to whether he actually had adopted that holding. 
Healy’s point is that a close reading of the cases leading to Abrams, 
and all the surrounding events and interactions, reveal a genuine change of 
heart on the scope and reach of the freedom of speech. Holmes did change 
his mind—ultimately to the eternal advantage of the First Amendment. 
Despite Hand’s happy words, it would take a while before a majority of 
the Court or the public came around to Holmes’s vision. Holmes’s 
remaining thirteen years on the Court largely involved more dissents and 
separate opinions, his own and those of his First Amendment ally, 
Brandeis.68 He never won a majority over to his position and did not live to 
see a truly speech-protective jurisprudence emanating from the Court. He 
did remain on the Court long enough to join the majority in Near, the first 
Supreme Court decision invalidating a state law on First Amendment 
grounds.69 
Nevertheless, The Great Dissent is a fundamentally optimistic book. 
Holmes evolved from a jurist who saw no value in protecting dissent or 
dissenters and who viewed the First Amendment with great skepticism. 
And even if Holmes remained largely in dissent until the end of his time on 
the Court, Healy could safely describe what has grown from the seeds 
 
65.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 243. 
66.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
67.  FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK SUPREME 
COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 132 (1981). 
68.  See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 
140 (1922) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting); U.S. ex rel Milwaukee Soc. Democratic 
Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 
239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Collins, supra note 2, at 398–99 
(providing statistics on Holmes’s votes in free speech cases). 
69.  Near, 283 U.S. at 722–23; see FRIENDLY, supra note 67, at 172–74. 
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planted in that Abrams opinion. Indeed, Holmes arguably could do more in 
dissent at the early stages—dissents cost him little personally and the Court 
little institutionally, as it upheld each of the convictions. This might explain 
why Holmes resisted his colleagues’ pre-Abrams entreaties not to release 
what would become his iconic dissent. 
II. THE PROGENY 
New York Times v. Sullivan turned fifty in 2014, making it and its 
progeny an ongoing story. Levine and Wermiel cover twenty-six of those 
years, examining in-depth twenty-seven cases from New York Times until 
Brennan’s retirement from the Court in 1990, with brief discussion of three 
cases decided in the next decade. The book’s structure is straightforward, 
moving chronologically and in great and revealing detail through New York 
Times and each of the subsequent cases. This is “Brennan’s story, his take 
on how the constitutional law of defamation and related claims came to 
be.”70 But Brennan’s story simultaneously tells the story of the Court, 
changing membership, and evolving First Amendment doctrine. 
It is difficult to overstate the changes wrought by New York Times. The 
Court shifted defamation from the realm of tort to the realm of 
constitutional law71—as William Van Alstyne puts it, it “switched the orbit 
of libel law from far out frozen darkness to the sunny warmth of the first 
amendment.”72 The Court, via Justice Brennan, insisted that the First 
Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”73 Moreover, because 
some factual error is inevitable in free debate, free expression needs 
“breathing space” to survive.74 That breathing space comes from strict 
constitutional limitations on the reach of state defamation law. As a matter 
of the First Amendment, a public official could not recover damages for 
even false and defamatory speech relating to his official conduct unless he 
could show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were 
false, that they were “of and concerning” that particular identifiable 
government official, and that they were spoken with “actual malice,” that 
 
70.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at xii. 
71.  HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 56 (1965); Kalven, supra 
note 24, at 192 (calling constitutional law the “Valhalla of the law school curriculum”). 
72.  William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press—An 
Extended Comment on “The Anderson Solution”, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 793 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
73.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
74.  Id. at 272. 
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is, knowing the statements were false or with reckless disregard for their 
truth or falsity.75 
From these beginnings, the Court sought to refine and define these 
skeletal free speech principles in subsequent cases, and The Progeny carries 
the reader through the various steps and missteps, using the papers of 
Brennan and other Court members. The Court extended the protections to 
criminal liability,76 defined when expression is “of and concerning” a 
particular, identifiable plaintiff,77 and applied the actual malice requirement 
to speech involving “public figures,” those who “play an influential role in 
ordering society,” enjoy access to mass communications to influence public 
affairs and counter criticism, and have achieved a degree of notoriety or 
have thrust themselves into public controversies.78 Brennan even 
momentarily led a plurality to apply actual malice to all cases involving 
speech on matters of public or general interest, regardless of the nature or 
identity of the plaintiff.79 Although the Court quickly retrenched from 
that,80 the public nature of the speech has not dropped from the analysis 
entirely—speech on matters of public concern is presumptively true, 
placing on even a private plaintiff the burden of proving falsity.81 In 
addition, the Court applied First Amendment principles to other torts82 and 
explored how substantive First Amendment considerations affected 
underlying procedural and jurisdictional issues.83 
The Progeny shows how each of these doctrinal developments came to 
pass, laying out the facts and litigation posture of each case and describing 
in rich detail the arguments, internal deliberations, discussions, and 
dynamics that produced each decision. The focus, of course, is Brennan. As 
the author of New York Times, he had the most invested in maintaining the 
strongest and most vigorous version of that doctrine; protecting his First 
Amendment conception became a major cause of his time on the Court. 
The book is largely descriptive, which is not a negative—it provides 
details, background, analysis, and critique that are essential to 
 
75.  Id. at 277, 279, 285–86. 
76.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
77.  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80–83 (1966). 
78.  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). 
Brennan strongly influenced what became Warren’s conception of public figures. See LEVINE & 
WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 76–77. 
79.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1971) (plurality opinion of Brennan, 
J.). 
80.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); see also Wolston v. Reader’s Digest 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166–69 (1979). 
81.  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768–69 (1986). 
82.  Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
83.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 
(1984); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
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understanding the evolution in this area of law. In the course of that 
narrative, however, some normative themes emerge. 
One is how shifting personnel and coalitions affected the 
jurisprudential direction over the next quarter-century (and even to today). 
When the Court decided New York Times, Brennan and the “actual malice” 
test garnered six votes and reflected a more moderate form of immunity. 
Three Justices—Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Arthur Goldberg—
urged a categorical constitutional rule prohibiting any defamation liability 
against media defendants for any speech about government, public issues, 
and public officials, even if the speaker knew the statements were false.84 
Brennan, with memories of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s effective political 
use of intentionally false statements fresh in his mind and personal 
experience, was unwilling to go so far. While he expressed sympathy for 
the more speech-protective absolutist view, he clung to a position that 
constitutional protection ran out at the intentional lie or knowing untruth.85 
Maintaining coalitions and majorities proved difficult almost 
immediately. Within three years, “what had previously been the Court’s 
public consensus on such matters had largely disappeared.”86 Only three 
Justices—Chief Justice Earl Warren, Brennan, and Byron White—really 
wanted to extend the actual malice requirement to public figures. And 
Warren went along only reluctantly, while also agreeing that the media 
defendant in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts87 had acted with actual malice, 
the only early case in which a defamation plaintiff prevailed before the 
Court.88 Neither Black nor Douglas ever embraced the actual malice 
standard, other than as a “necessary inconvenience on the path to what they 
hoped would eventually become absolute First Amendment protection for 
debate about public issues.”89 
Shifting coalitions coincided with shifting personnel. New York Times 
was decided during the short period in the mid-1960s in which Brennan 
was at the height of his power as the Warren’s Court’s intellectual engine; 
as Lucas Powe argues, the appointment of Goldberg in 1962 provided five 
assured votes for the civil libertarian position and little need to convince 
any wavering Justices.90 The New York Times progeny developed just as 
that majority was disappearing. One year later, Goldberg resigned from the 
Court and was replaced by Abe Fortas; while a reliable liberal vote on 
 
84.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., 
concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in the result). 
85.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 19. 
86.  Id. at 78. 
87.  388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion). 
88.  Id. at 169–70 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). 
89.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 78. 
90.  LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303–04 (2000). 
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many issues, Fortas provided the deciding vote in favor of the plaintiff in 
Butts, a vote Goldberg certainly would not have cast.91 Within a decade, 
only three Justices—Brennan, Potter Stewart (generally a reliable vote on 
free speech issues), and White—remained from the New York Times Court. 
By 1971, only Chief Justice Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun joined 
Brennan in extending actual malice to speech on all matters of “public or 
general interest.”92 And with Warren no longer wielding the assignment 
power and relying on Brennan as his right hand, Rosenbloom marked the 
last time Brennan wrote for the Court in a progeny case.93 
Rosenbloom embodies the collapsing and shifting coalitions and the 
increased difficulty for Brennan in producing a majority.94 A common 
criticism of Brennan is that his desire to “get a Court” would cause him to 
compromise constitutional principle, drafting the opinion to ensure a 
majority rather than to push the best First Amendment rules.95 But now 
recognizing that a majority was not to be had—Black continued to insist 
that liability was not available even for the knowing lie96 and White wanted 
to focus on reporters’ privilege rather than actual malice97—Brennan was 
willing to go it alone and push actual malice in the unique direction he 
wanted, a position he would continue to urge, without majority support, for 
the remainder of his time on the Court.98 
White, even more than Warren, ultimately soured on the actual malice 
regime altogether, which he viewed as over-protecting speech and under-
protecting individual reputation. The distance between Brennan and White 
can be seen in Gertz, where the Court held that a private figure could 
recover actual damages on a lesser showing than actual malice (such as 
simple negligence), although a showing of some fault was necessary for 
liability and a showing of actual malice was required for punitive 
damages.99 Both Brennan and White dissented, but for polar-opposite 
reasons. Brennan continued to insist that actual malice should apply to 
 
91.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 66–81. 
92.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971) (plurality opinion). And both 
seemed more concerned with ruling against the plaintiff because he was a “smut peddler” who 
published nudist magazines. See LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 117. 
93.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 125. 
94.  Id. at 116. 
95.  But see Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk With Judge Richard Posner, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Sept. 29, 2011, at 47 (quoting Posner, a former Brennan clerk, as defining this as Brennan’s strength as 
a Justice). 
96. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment). Douglas did not 
participate in the case. 
97.  Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring). 
98.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 117; see, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 
U.S. 767, 779–80 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361 
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
99.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–49. 
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media reports about private persons involved on matters of public or 
general interest, meaning the majority erroneously constricted the First 
Amendment’s scope.100 White believed that the majority unduly infringed 
state power to determine the scope of civil liability for defamation, thereby 
erroneously expanding the First Amendment’s scope.101 
A second theme of The Progeny is a certain pessimism surrounding the 
fate of the speech-protective regime Brennan initiated in New York Times. 
Some of this is endemic to writing about William Brennan; biographies 
show him fretting about his legacy and the endurance of the precedents he 
helped establish.102 Given the near-complete turnover and the fact that 
Brennan wrote no opinions for the Court in this area for his final nineteen 
years on the bench, The Progeny depicts him waging a rearguard action, 
fighting through concurrences and dissents and through personal behind-
the-scenes persuasion (for which Brennan was famous and uniquely 
skilled103) to keep things as close to where he wanted them to go. For 
example, he effusively praised Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion 
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell104 holding that a public figure could not 
recover from a magazine for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
over a parody advertisement—Brennan told his colleague that he would 
“enthusiastically join your splendid opinion.”105 Brennan singled Hustler as 
the opinion that “wipes away” any concerns about the survival of New York 
Times.106 Of course, that did not stop him from fretting about a 
retrenchment once he was no longer on the Court to “stand guard against 
future assaults on his handiwork.”107 
Ironically, given the pessimistic tone, The Progeny demonstrates that 
Brennan got most of what he wanted doctrinally. Although Gertz rejected 
Brennan’s Rosenbloom extension of actual malice to all cases involving 
speech on matters of public or general interest, the nature of the speech 
remains part of the constitutional analysis, thanks to Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.108 In an opinion that Brennan assigned109 to 
 
100.  Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
101.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting); LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 124–25. 
102.  HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 277, 280 (1995); STERN 
& WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 544. 
103.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 7; Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990) (“The skill in building coalitions and taste for compromise that 
had stood him in such good stead in the years of glory enabled him to project his influence long after 
the balance of power had shifted against him.”). 
104.  485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
105.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 307. 
106.  Id. at 308. 
107.  Id. at 342. 
108.  475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
109.  With Burger in dissent, Brennan, then the senior-most Justice in the majority, assigned the 
opinion. 
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Sandra Day O’Connor specifically as a reward for voting with him,110 the 
Court held that where speech is on a matter of public concern, it is 
presumptively true and even a private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving falsity, even if she need not prove actual malice.111 And even 
Brennan’s “loss” in his final progeny case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co.112 has not proven devastating, as lower courts continue to closely 
analyze and allow liability only on statements that can reasonably 
constitute factual assertions capable of being proven true.113 
Unlike The Great Dissent, The Progeny need not grapple with whether 
Brennan changed or regretted his earlier approaches, as he remained a 
consistent champion of broad free speech throughout. Brennan did come to 
believe that he erred in using “actual malice” to describe the constitutional 
standard; the term “only confused things” between malice in its ordinary 
sense of ill will or hatred, and malice as he intended, meaning knowing or 
reckless falsehood.114 He took pains in Garrison v. Louisiana115 (the first 
post-New York Times case, decided only a few months later) to emphasize 
that the malice at issue was “intent to inflict harm through falsehood,” 
rather than a more general attempt to inflict harm.116 Nevertheless, the 
confusion has continued. In one of the first cases after Brennan’s 
retirement, Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Court to acknowledge that it 
would be better to instruct juries not about “actual malice,” but about 
“publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
as to truth or falsity.”117 
III. HOLMES AND BRENNAN, ABRAMS AND NEW YORK TIMES 
Abrams and New York Times are both as important for what they say as 
for what they portend. Learned Hand assured Holmes that in time, the 
Court could not help but accept and implement Holmes’s ideas from 
Abrams.118 In his famous Supreme Court Review essay written just after 
New York Times, Harry Kalven similarly predicted the decision’s 
extension, insisting that “the invitation to follow a dialectic progression 
from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the 
 
110.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 295. 
111.  Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 768–69. 
112.  497 U.S. 1 (1990) (rejecting rigid fact/opinion distinction and holding that liability could 
attach even to statements of opinion and conjecture). 
113.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 338–39. 
114.  Id. at 342. 
115.  379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
116.  Id. at 73–74. 
117.  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991). 
118.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 219–22. 
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public domain, like art, seems to me to be overwhelming.”119 While The 
Great Dissent ends on potential, The Progeny traces the progression that 
Kalven predicted. Yet the books end in paradoxical places. The Great 
Dissent ends with Holmes largely in dissent, but with a hopeful future. The 
Progeny ends with Brennan mainly in the majority, in that the 
fundamentals of New York Times remain secure, but sometimes in dissent, 
often writing separately, and ultimately exhausted from having worked so 
hard to protect those fundamentals and anxious about the future. 
In some ways, New York Times departed from Holmes and Abrams. 
Notably, it made no mention of “clear and present danger” or the Court’s 
World War I cases, a silence Kalven called “deafening.”120 And New York 
Times found a better metaphorical touchstone for the First Amendment 
than the “sterile example of a man falsely yelling fire in a crowded 
theater.”121 
In more significant ways, however, New York Times is the 
jurisprudential heir to the Abrams dissent, the first significant triumph of 
Holmes’s First Amendment vision, and the case that proved Hand correct. 
In fact, New York Times marked the first time Brennan ever cited the 
Abrams dissent as a member of the Supreme Court, as he finally pursued, 
identified, and isolated what he called the “central meaning of the First 
Amendment.”122 
First, both opinions questioned the viability of seditious libel under the 
First Amendment. This concern was obvious in Abrams. The Espionage 
Act, as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918, was a seditious libel statute, 
prohibiting speech and conduct that could bring government officials or the 
“form of government” into “contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.”123 
New York Times dealt with the tort of defamation, not on its face seditious 
libel or even analogous to seditious libel. But the case arose out of a 
coordinated campaign of Southern officials using defamation suits and 
potential multi-million-dollar judgments to punish the Times and other 
national newspapers for criticizing or expressing dissenting views towards 
Southern governments, Jim Crow, and segregation—creating the functional 
equivalent of seditious libel.124 
 
119.  Kalven, supra note 24, at 221. 
120.  Id. at 213–14. 
121.  Id. at 205. 
122.  Id. at 208. 
123.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919). 
124.  ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 42–
43 (1991); Kalven, supra note 24, at 200; Howard M. Wasserman, A Jurisdictional Perspective on New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 901, 909 (2013); infra notes 260–273 and accompanying 
text. 
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Both opinions thus reached out to address the still-open question of the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, a seditious libel law enacted 
less than a decade after ratification of the First Amendment (the law lapsed 
three years after its enactment, before the opportunity for final judicial 
review). Holmes insisted that “[h]istory seems to me against the notion” 
that seditious libel could exist under the First Amendment, pointing out that 
“the United States through many years had shown its repentance for the 
Sedition Act of 1798 by repaying fines that it imposed.”125 Brennan was 
more emphatic on the point. After describing contemporaneous objections 
to the Act by James Madison and others, Brennan insisted that “the attack 
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history,” pointing to 
subsequent legislation repaying fines, as well as opinions of several 
Justices, including Holmes, assuming that statute’s invalidity.126 This 
revealed a “broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it 
imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”127 
Second, for both opinions the core of the First Amendment was 
political speech and the right (indeed, obligation) to criticize government, 
government policy, and government officials. The discussions of seditious 
libel offered a new starting point—“defamation of the government is an 
impossible notion for a democracy.”128 This is the significance of Holmes’s 
“fighting faiths” idea—conflicting political opinions, exhortations, and 
ideas must be given an opportunity to compete for acceptance, and 
government may not check expression of competing ideas that may prove 
more appealing or ultimately successful. The “truth”—whatever that may 
mean in the realm of opinion and ideas—might prevail in that competition 
and government should not interfere. 
This anticipates what would come in New York Times.129 While he did 
not talk about a marketplace of ideas, Brennan emphasized the “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”130 an idea that necessarily disables 
government from inhibiting debate. Critics of government must be free 
from both liability and the self-censorship created by fear of liability—
regardless of whether liability is civil or criminal and regardless of whether 
 
125.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
126.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
127.  Id.; KALVEN, supra note 71, at 58; see also Kalven, supra note 24, at 205–07. 
128.  Kalven, supra note 24, at 205. 
129.  See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33, 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. 
Stone eds., 2002). 
130.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. 
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imposed by federal or state government.131 And even in the realm of 
statements of fact, error is inevitable; to give freedom of expression the 
necessary “breathing space,” falsity and defamatory content alone do not 
provide a basis for removing speech from the protection of the First 
Amendment.132 
Third, each opinion is a product of its own unique crisis—Abrams of 
the post-World War I Red Scare, New York Times of the Civil Rights Era. 
Vincent Blasi calls these “pathological” periods, “historical periods when 
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments 
are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically.”133 The “core 
commitments” of the First Amendment “are those regarding the practical 
wisdom and moral propriety of tolerating unorthodox, disrespectful, 
potentially disruptive ideas.”134 First Amendment doctrine must respond 
vigorously to pathological periods, to ensure that reviewing courts recall 
and abide by those core commitments and do not allow society to abandon 
them. Blasi praises both the New York Times majority and Abrams dissent 
as doing just that—“instances of brilliant and highly sophisticated judicial 
innovation” necessary for application in the worst of times to protect 
unpopular speakers in stressful situations.135 
Blasi additionally highlights New York Times as demonstrating the 
uniquely localized nature of some pathologies and the significance of a 
federal court decision that “defused or effectively repudiated a program of 
systematic repression of unpopular speakers by local officials. Precisely 
because these were local pathologies, the national judiciary was for the 
most part immune from the pressures and fears that so exercised local 
officials.”136 Of course, the First Amendment was only available to respond 
to this localized pathology because of a different Holmes-era innovation—
incorporation of the First Amendment against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.137 
Finally, New York Times follows naturally from the Abrams dissent in 
the system of common law constitutionalism that defines the modern First 
Amendment. As David Strauss argues, the “emergence” of American free 
speech is a “common-law story” of evolution and precedent, with features 
 
131.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); KALVEN, supra note 71, at 58–59. 
132.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271–73. 
133.  Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
449, 449–50 (1985). 
134.  Id. at 462. 
135.  Id. at 475, 476. 
136.  Id. at 509. 
137.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming that the First Amendment applied 
against the states); id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The general principle of free speech, it seems to 
me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been 
given to the word ‘liberty’ as there used . . . .”). 
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“hammered out” in a series of judicial decisions and extrajudicial 
developments.138 American free expression is not about the text of the First 
Amendment or about the views or intentions of the drafters.139 The First 
Amendment was not built around “clear and present danger” before 
Holmes wrote those words in Schenck. And to the extent the First 
Amendment was “decreed” in Holmes’s application of that test to protect 
(for the first time) dissenting speech in Abrams, that decree was announced 
in a dissent, an opinion carrying no force of law.140 It took another half 
century of judicial evolution, up to and including New York Times, which 
similarly fits not within the Framers’ intent or historical understanding, but 
within the common-law chain of precedent dating back to Abrams.141 
IV. EXTENDING THE PROGENY 
Brennan was pessimistic about the future and continued vitality of New 
York Times upon his 1990 retirement.142 The Progeny reflects that 
pessimism when discussing the mixed results of the three progeny cases 
from the first decade after Brennan left the Court. 
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court rejected the media 
defendant’s claim of First Amendment immunity from a source’s breach of 
contract suit for the defendant’s failure to maintain his promised 
anonymity.143 In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., the Court 
recognized that inaccurate quotations can form the basis for liability only if 
the alteration results in a “material change” in the meaning of those words, 
such that they would have a different effect on the mind of the reader than 
if they were accurate.144 But Masson remanded for further fact-finding as to 
several quotations, prolonging litigation that already had lasted seven years, 
would last another five, and would cost the media defendants millions of 
dollars.145 Finally, a purported majority in Bartnicki v. Vopper held that 
media defendants could not be liable for broadcasting a recording of an 
unlawfully intercepted phone call touching on a matter of public concern, 
where defendants were uninvolved in the unlawful interception and 
 
138.  Strauss, supra note 129, at 33. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 49. 
141.  Id. at 58; but see Ronald A. Cass, Weighing Constitutional Anchors: New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan and the Misdirection of First Amendment Doctrine, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 399, 410 
(2014) (criticizing the New York Times’s “infidelity to decisional constraints evidenced in Brennan’s 
casting off the lines of historical understanding of the Amendment’s meaning”). 
142.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 342. 
143.  501 U.S. 663, 672 (1990). Cohen was a 5–4 decision, with Justice David Souter, Brennan’s 
replacement, writing a dissent, id. at 676, exactly where we expect Brennan would have been. 
144.  501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). 
145.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 343–48. 
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obtained the recording lawfully.146 The opinion by John Paul Stevens 
closed with a strong reaffirmation of Brennan’s New York Times principles 
that “would almost certainly have brought a smile to his face.”147 On the 
other hand, three Justices dissented.148 And while purporting to join the 
majority, Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, applied a more even 
balancing analysis, one seemingly inconsistent with the majority and one 
that might produce a different result in a different case.149 
Fortunately for Brennan’s vision of the First Amendment, The Progeny 
ends early. In the past five years, the Court has produced three new cases 
that comfortably fit into the New York Times progeny. Interestingly, none 
involved a defamation claim or an institutional media defendant, befitting 
the Court’s seeming lack of interest in issues relating to the press.150 
Nevertheless, the speech claimant prevailed in all three cases. And all three 
produced at least plurality opinions that would have pleased (and likely 
been joined by) both Brennan and post-Abrams Holmes. 
In fact, that the cases involved non-defamation and non-media contexts 
demonstrates the lasting power and influence of what Brennan established 
in New York Times. He created not merely constitutional rules for 
defamation, but broad constitutional principles protecting a wide range of 
unpopular speakers and speech from a wide range of civil and criminal 
liabilities.151 To the extent Brennan (or his biographers) were concerned 
about the survival of his greatest First Amendment legacy, these cases 
should lay those concerns to rest. 
A. Snyder v. Phelps 
The defendants in Snyder were leaders of the Westboro Baptist Church, 
a small religious denomination (its membership consisting mainly of 
members of the Phelps family) that believed God was punishing the United 
States for a variety of public-policy sins, primarily related to 
homosexuality, by causing the deaths of soldiers fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Westboro became infamous for picketing funerals of soldiers 
 
146.  532 U.S. 514, 525, 535 (2001). 
147.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 364–65. 
148.  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
149.  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Breyer, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring); LEVINE & 
WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 362–63; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First 
Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1113 (2002); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 
421, 442 (2006). 
150.  Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1820, 1833–34 
(2012). 
151.  See id. at 1822 (discussing the Roberts Court’s commitment to protecting unpopular 
speakers). 
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and celebrities, as well as for the content of its messages, with slogans such 
as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for 9/11,” and “God Hates 
Fags.” 
Westboro protested the funeral of Matthew Snyder, a Marine killed in 
the line of duty in Iraq.152 Snyder’s father learned of the content of the signs 
displayed at his son’s funeral (although only from seeing television reports 
later that day—the protesters were several hundred feet away from the 
cemetery entrance and he did not see the signs himself) and about 
comments about his son on Westboro’s web site. He brought claims for 
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
Westboro and its leaders; a jury found for Snyder on the intentional 
infliction claim and awarded almost $11 million in damages, later remitted 
to $5 million.153 
In an opinion for eight Justices, Chief Justice John Roberts held that 
the First Amendment protects Westboro from any tort liability.154 He began 
with several ideas culled directly from New York Times—the profound 
national commitment to uninhibited, wide-open, and robust public debate; 
that speech on matters of public concern is “more than self-expression; it is 
the essence of self-government,”155 therefore entitled to special 
protection;156 and that free speech requires breathing space to survive.157 
Roberts also pointed to the risk of juries imposing liability simply because 
they dislike particular speakers and speech,158 a motivating concern in New 
York Times, in turn traceable to Holmes’s insistence that the core 
constitutional commitment must be “freedom for the thought that we 
hate.”159 
Snyder most closely recalls Hustler Magazine v. Falwell in that the 
plaintiff attempted to use the tort of intentional infliction as an end-run 
around defamation and the New York Times limitations on defamation 
liability for speech concerning public figures and matters of public 
concern.160 Levine and Wermiel discuss Falwell at length as one of 
Brennan’s final progeny cases; Brennan had cheered Rehnquist’s 
unanimous opinion in that case as demonstrating the continued vitality of 
New York Times and laying to rest any concerns for its survival.161 
 
152.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448–49 (2011). 
153.  Id. at 450. 
154.  Id. at 461. 
155.  Id. at 452. 
156.  Id. at 451–52. 
157.  Id. at 458 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). 
158.  Id. 
159.  United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
160.  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–54 (1988). 
161.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 307–08. 
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Critically, both Matthew Snyder and his father were private figures.162 
Snyder thus presented an open issue from Hustler—what if the plaintiff had 
been not Jerry Falwell, unquestionably a public figure,163 but Falwell’s 
mother, also mentioned in the ad parody but unquestionably a private 
figure? Roberts’s answer was that it did not matter. The critical issue was 
not the nature of the plaintiff but the nature of the speech—that Westboro’s 
protests addressed matters of public concern. Roberts adopted a broad 
definition, according special protection for any speech that “can ‘be fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community’”164 or that touches a “subject of general interest and of 
value and concern to the public.”165 Courts must analyze the “content, 
form, and context”166 of speech as indicated by the record as a whole—
reaffirming the constitutional obligation (also drawn from New York Times) 
to independently examine the record to ensure that any “‘judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’”167 
Applying that standard, the Court easily found Westboro’s speech to be 
on a matter of public concern. Westboro’s messages included “Don’t Pray 
for the USA” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”168 While such slogans 
“may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they 
highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its 
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals 
involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import.”169 That did 
not change because some of the signs were directed at private figures such 
as the Snyders, since the “overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s 
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”170 
Roberts deemphasized the Snyders’ private-figure status, focusing 
instead on the content of even the narrowest, most directed messages (such 
as suggestions that Matthew Snyder was in hell). This reflects Brennan’s 
position from his Rosenbloom plurality and Gertz dissent—constitutional 
significance attaches to the subject and content of the expression, broadly 
understood, not to the status of the plaintiff.171 For Brennan, Elmer Gertz 
was a private person involved in matters of public concern about which the 
 
162.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 470 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
163.  Hustler, 485 U.S. at 49. 
164.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
165.  Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)). 
166.  Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761(1985)). 
167.  Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)); see 
also Wasserman, supra note 124, at 913. 
168.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448. 
169.  Id. at 454. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 362 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
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defendant had spoken, such that the speech deserved heightened 
protection;172 so too for Roberts, the Snyders were private persons involved 
in matters of public concern about which Westboro was speaking. Once 
again, the doctrine had come around to reflect much of what Brennan 
wanted.173 
The Court then returned to Hustler’s insistence that “outrageousness,” 
the standard the jury used to impose liability against Westboro, is never an 
appropriate or meaningful standard with respect to speech on matters of 
public concern. As New York Times made clear, public debate may be 
“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp,”174 and the First 
Amendment cannot countenance jury verdicts, grounded in distaste for that 
sharpness and vehemence, as instruments for suppressing such attacks.175 
Roberts closed the opinion with rhetoric about the import of the 
freedom of speech that certainly would have pleased the wordsmith 
Holmes: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears 
of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On 
the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the 
speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect 
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle 
public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from 
tort liability for its picketing in this case.176 
B. United States v. Alvarez 
Congress enacted the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which made it a crime 
to “falsely represent[]” oneself as having “been awarded any decoration or 
medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States,” 
with an enhanced penalty for false representations related to the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.177 Alvarez, an elected member of the Three 
Valley Water District Board in California, announced at a public meeting 
that, “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 
 
172.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46–47). 
173.  Supra notes 102–113 and accompanying text. 
174.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
175.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458. 
176.  Id. at 460–61. 
177.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012)). 
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1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded 
many times by the same guy”—all of which was untrue.178 
A 6–3 majority held that Alvarez’s conviction under the Act could not 
survive First Amendment scrutiny. In a plurality opinion, Anthony 
Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Sonia Sotomayor) rejected the government’s argument that false statements 
lack all value and enjoy no constitutional protection.179 Kennedy 
acknowledged a number of precedents in the New York Times line in which 
the Court suggested as much, including Brennan’s majority opinion in 
Garrison v. Louisiana, decided several months after New York Times.180 
But those cases all arose from particularized contexts—defamation and 
other torts—in which a legally cognizable harm arose from the false 
statements.181 In other words, it was not falsity alone that had stripped 
speech of its constitutional immunity in those prior cases, but the legally 
cognizable harm flowing from falsity. Kennedy also described New York 
Times as a rule designed to ensure more speech, not less,182 meaning it 
would be perverse for such a rule to be repurposed as a basis for restricting 
speech in a new context. 
Having concluded that false statements of fact are not categorically 
without First Amendment protection, Kennedy analyzed the Stolen Valor 
Act as a content-based measure subject to strict scrutiny, finding 
insufficient the government interest in preserving the integrity of the 
military honors system. First, there was no evidence that false claims to 
having won military honors dilute the public’s perception of those awards 
or of the people who actually won them. Second, any confusion from false 
statements could be overcome by truthful counterspeech as  the remedy for 
false speech, citing both Holmes in Abrams and Brandeis in Whitney.183 
Kennedy specifically pointed to the community outrage over Alvarez’s 
false statements as demonstrating that no criminal law or criminal 
prosecution was necessary for the public to express support for its military 
heroes184 or its opposition to those who lie about being heroes. And 
similarly channeling Holmes’s aphoristic tendencies, Kennedy added that 
“[o]nly a weak society needs government protection or intervention before 
 
178.  Id. at 2542 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
Alvarez also claimed, falsely, that he played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that he married a 
Mexican starlet. Id. 
179.  Id. at 2544–45. 
180.  Id. (citing cases). 
181.  Id. at 2545. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 2550 (citing Whitney v. California, 254 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
184.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549–50. 
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it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth. Truth needs neither handcuffs 
nor a badge for its vindication.”185 
Kennedy’s opinion reflects several important features of both 
Brennan’s and Holmes’s First Amendment. In his Gertz dissent, Brennan 
insisted that the knowing or reckless lie on matters of public concern is 
unprotected only to “strike the proper accommodation between avoidance 
of media self-censorship and protection of individual reputations.”186 But 
when, as under the Stolen Valor Act, false statements in no way implicate 
individual reputation or otherwise cause individual legal harms, there is no 
longer a need for any accommodation, thus no justification for restricting 
even knowing lies touching on matters of public concern. In addition, the 
Act bore the hallmarks and risks of seditious libel, establishing a “political 
crime that does not punish harm but instead tries to enforce respect for the 
government.”187 Both Brennan and Holmes recognized seditious libel’s 
fundamental incompatibility with the First Amendment.188 
Finally, Kennedy’s reliance on counterspeech and the marketplace of 
ideas to preserve the dignity of military awards and award recipients 
sounds like Brennan’s majority opinions in the flag-burning cases189 
(arguably Brennan’s second greatest free-speech contribution).190 As 
Brennan put it, the “way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish 
those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that 
they are wrong.”191 Similarly, Kennedy insisted that, however strong the 
governmental desire to preserve sanctity and respect for patriotic symbols 
and awards, it does not justify punishing those who disrespect those 
symbols. 
Appropriately, Kennedy has emerged as Brennan’s speech-protective 
heir on the Court. While Levine and Wermiel somewhat question that 
perception based on Kennedy’s approach in defamation cases in his early 
days on the Court,192 his voting record overwhelmingly favors First 
Amendment claimants.193 
 
185.  Id. at 2550–51. 
186.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
187.  Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and the Government’s Good Name: Seditious Libel and the 
Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136, 160 (2012), http://www.uclalawreview.org/?p=3110. 
188.  Kalven, supra note 24, at 204; supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text. 
189.  See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
190.  See infra Part V.C. 
191.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419. 
192.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 334. 
193.  Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167, 175 (2013); Eugene Volokh, How 
the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2001). In Chief 
Justice Roberts’s decade on the Court, he has emerged as a similarly strong vote and author for the 
speech-protective position. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); McCutcheon v. 
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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The other two votes for invalidating the Act came from Breyer, joined 
by Elena Kagan, although concurring only in the judgment. Breyer echoed 
many of the plurality’s themes with respect to constitutional protection for 
false statements of fact. He insisted that prior judicial statements about 
falsehoods lacking protection “cannot be read to mean ‘no protection at 
all,’” since false statements of fact may serve useful human objectives, both 
private and public.194 He recognized that empowering government to 
punish false statements creates a risk of selective prosecution of unpopular 
speakers and unpopular speech.195 And he emphasized the limited scope of 
statutes at issue in prior cases—whether because they required proof of 
specific harms to identifiable individuals (the key to defamation liability in 
New York Times), required mens rea, or were limited only to specific 
contexts likely to produce specific harms, such as false statements to law 
enforcement or perjury in judicial proceedings.196 
Breyer’s point of departure with the plurality was the level of 
scrutiny—he refused to commit to a “strict categorical analysis,” instead 
performing what he called a “proportionality analysis”197 resembling 
intermediate scrutiny. As in his concurring opinion in Bartnicki, Breyer 
demanded a less weighted, more even and open-ended ad hoc balancing. In 
both cases, that balancing invalidated the statutes before the Court because 
the government had not carried its burden.198 But such an even balance, one 
with less of a thumb on the scale in favor of speech,199 might produce 
different, less speech-protective results in other cases and circumstances. It 
also demonstrates the expansive gap between Brennan’s free-speech 
jurisprudence and Breyer’s. 
Levels of scrutiny to one side, however, Alvarez featured six firm votes 
that even knowingly false statements of fact may enjoy constitutional 
protection absent special contexts or circumstances, namely legally 
cognizable harms to identifiable persons. Surely Brennan would agree. 
While unwilling to accepted complete immunity for all false statements in 
 
194.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also United States v. Alvarez, 638 F. 3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (insisting that “for mortals living means lying” and 
providing a laundry list of examples of everyday lies). 
195.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
196.  Id. at 2553–54. 
197.  Id. at 2551–52. 
198.  Compare id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the government 
had not explained why a more finely tuned statute would not work) with Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 538 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he statutes, as applied in these circumstances, do not 
reasonably reconcile the competing constitutional objectives.”). 
199.  Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624 (1982). 
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New York Times, his focus on knowledge as the constitutional line for false 
speech assumed speech about, and harmful to, an identifiable person.200 
C. Air Wisconsin Airlines Co. v. Hoeper 
The most recent progeny case is Air Wisconsin Airlines Co. v. 
Hoeper.201 This one did not generate attention or excitement since it did not 
involve media and was not a true First Amendment case, instead involving 
statutory immunity. Nevertheless, it shows how much Brennan’s New York 
Times handiwork has entwined itself into the legal fabric, in Congress as 
well as the Court. 
Just after 9/11, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001 (ATSA); the statute created the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), then placed primary onus on the airlines, as 
the actors with consistent and direct contact with the flying public, to 
identify and report threats and suspicious behavior to TSA.202 Congress 
granted airlines and airline employees immunity from civil liability for 
such reporting, except where the report was made with actual knowledge 
that it was false, inaccurate, or misleading, or with reckless disregard as to 
its truth or falsity.203 In other words, Congress codified New York Times 
and actual malice.204 
But Air Wisconsin unanimously took one more step, insisting that, 
unless Congress provided to the contrary (which it had not in ATSA), the 
statute incorporated the complete body of New York Times jurisprudence at 
the time the statute was enacted.205 This included the principle that liability 
only attaches to false statements of fact; more precisely, liability attaches 
only where statements are “materially false,” meaning minor inaccuracies 
do not render a statement false so long as “the substance, the gist, the sting, 
of the libelous charge” is true.206 A statement is materially false only if it 
would produce “‘a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] 
from that which the . . . truth would have produced.’”207 Under ATSA, the 
 
200.  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966) (Brennan, J., for the Court) (requiring that false 
implications from statements be specifically of and concerning the plaintiff); id. at 86 (stating that 
“[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation,” but 
that the Constitution limits those protections where the interest in public discussion is sufficiently 
great); see LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 19; supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
201.  134 S. Ct. 852 (2014). 
202.  Id. at 852, 857–58. 
203.  49 U.S.C. § 44941 (2012). 
204.  Air Wis., 134 S. Ct. at 861. 
205.  Id. at 864–65. 
206.  Id. at 861. 
207.  Id. at 861, 863 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)). 
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relevant listener is a reasonable TSA officer receiving a report from airline 
officials.208 
Air Wisconsin arose when the plaintiff, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, failed 
a flight simulator test; he had agreed with the company in advance that he 
would be terminated if he failed this final test. The plaintiff responded 
angrily to failing, slamming his headset and loudly accusing airline 
officials of railroading him. Several hours later, after extensive discussion, 
airline officials contacted TSA about the plaintiff, who was booked on a 
flight from Virginia (where the simulator test had been administered) to 
Denver. They reported (1) that the plaintiff was a Federal Flight Deck 
Officer (FFDO)—a pilot deputized by TSA and authorized to carry a 
firearm while flying, although not when traveling as a passenger or 
attending training—“who may be armed”; (2) that an “unstable pilot” (or 
someone about whose “mental stability” they were concerned) was (3) 
“terminated today.”209 
While the Court was unanimous on the appropriate standard of material 
falsity, it divided on application. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Sonia 
Sotomayor granted the airline immunity by applying the materiality 
standard in a highly forgiving way. Importantly, she refused to too-finely 
parse the defendant’s statements, to second-guess specific word choices 
made in the heat of the moment in trying to handle fast-moving situations, 
or to demand qualification of every statement to avoid any risk of 
misinterpretation. As to each of the challenged statements: 
(1) While airline officials had no reason to believe the plaintiff actually 
was armed at the time, since he was not authorized to carry a firearm when 
flying to and from training, that misstatement was not material.210 It would 
be enough for a reasonable TSA officer that an FFDO was upset about 
losing his job and was getting on a plane, regardless of indications about 
whether he was in a position to presently be armed.211 
(2) While speaking of the plaintiff as “unstable” could carry 
connotations of mental illness that were not true, officials could as easily 
and as accurately have described him as having “blown up” following the 
test, which would have had the same material effect on a listener.212 
(3) While the plaintiff was not actually terminated until the following 
day (and thus the statement to TSA officials that he had been “terminated 
today” was false when made), the plaintiff had agreed in advance that he 
would be terminated if he failed the final simulator test. It was not material 
 
208.  Id. at 864. 
209.  Id. at 859. 
210.  Id. at 864–65. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. at 865–66. 
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that he had not yet been fired, when he knew firing was inevitable and 
imminent.213 
 This all reflects a decidedly speech-protective version of the New York 
Times principles and ideals. 
The one limit on Air Wisconsin might be that it was a national security 
case more than a free speech case, which might explain the greater 
solicitude from the Court. The case did not directly involve the First 
Amendment, the media, or expression on matters of public concern. The 
case threatened neither the institutional press covering a social-change 
movement nor the lonely critic tossing leaflets off the roof. Imposing 
liability here would have borne no resemblance to seditious libel, as would 
a judgment against the Times in 1960s Alabama. Any chilling effect would 
not have affected public debate, but only a company reporting suspicious 
behavior to a government agency. 
Moreover, the majority emphasized the fast-moving and potentially 
dangerous situations involved in TSA reporting, which weighed against 
requiring “precise wording” as a condition for statutory immunity.214 Such 
fast-moving conditions are absent in the typical defamation case, where a 
media outlet has the time, infrastructure, and expectation of precise 
wording, especially for the written word. This might cause the Court to 
demand greater linguistic precision in a different case. 
V. IF NOT HOLMES, THEN BRENNAN? 
The fundamental premise of The Great Dissent is that Holmes’s change 
of heart and mind in Abrams transformed the First Amendment and 
America’s connection to, and conception of, free speech.215 Subsequent to 
the book’s publication, Healy and Michael Dorf debated a different world: 
What if Holmes had not changed his mind about the freedom of speech in 
Abrams, but had continued to adhere to his views from Schenck, Frohwerk, 
and Debs? Would any other Justice or judge have picked up the mantle of 
free speech? Dorf believes we might have gotten to a similar place, since 
others were thinking about the First Amendment during and after Holmes’s 
time.216 Healy considers several likely candidates, but finds each lacking.217 
 
213.  Id. at 865. 
214.  Id. 
215.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 7; see also Collins, supra note 2, at 377 (“It is undeniable: free 
speech in America was never the same after 1919.”). 
216.  Mike Dorf, Holmes, Speech and the Power of Ideas, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/08/holmes-speech-and-power-of-ideas.html. 
217.  Thomas Healy, Holmes, Speech and the Power of Ideas—A Response, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 
8, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/08/holmes-speech-and-power-of-ideas_8.html. 
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The obvious candidate would have been Brandeis, Holmes’s 
contemporary, friend, and jurisprudential ally, who certainly shared a broad 
vision for the freedom of speech. Brandeis made his own contribution to 
early First Amendment canon with his concurring opinion (joined by 
Holmes) in Whitney v. California,218 which Vincent Blasi labeled “arguably 
the most important essay ever written, on or off the bench, on the meaning 
of the first amendment.”219 Brandeis struck similar themes to Holmes, 
stressing the constitutional import of protecting dissenting, even noxious, 
viewpoints as the means of discovering political truth; the value of counter-
speech and the competition of ideas; and the power of time and thought to 
correct evil or wrong ideas.220 But they reached the same conclusion from 
different points—as Blasi explains, “Holmes emphasized fatalism. 
Brandeis stressed courage.”221 In fact, some scholars argue that the core of 
the modern First Amendment—centrality of political expression, strong 
protection for political dissenters, and the “nearly universal acceptance” of 
broad protection for speech—reflects Brandeis and democracy, populism, 
and republican self-government more than it does Holmes and his 
marketplace of ideas.222 
Healy doubts Brandeis could have taken the lead, however. Brandeis 
virtually never parted with the majority in First Amendment cases without 
Holmes—he joined the Court without comment in Schenck, Frohwerk, and 
Debs—and did not dissent on his own until “Holmes broke the ice.”223 
Rather than dissenting himself, Brandeis instead would convince Holmes to 
dissent (Holmes once described it to Laski as having been “catspawned”), 
then join that opinion.224 More importantly, even had Brandeis gone off on 
his own, he might not have brought anyone with him. Brandeis largely 
remained an outsider as the first Jewish Justice who was held in contempt 
by many in the establishment,225 even including Holmes’s wife, who 
generally snubbed Brandeis and made no efforts to socialize with him or 
his wife.226 
 
218.  274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
219.  Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion 
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988). 
220.  Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
221.  Blasi, supra note 133, at 463. 
222.  Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 406 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); see Collins, supra note 2, at 
376. 
223.  Healy, supra note 217. But see Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
224.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 70. 
225.  Id. at 69. 
226.  Id. at 70. 
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A second possibility is Learned Hand, shown as the first mover among 
the correspondents pushing Holmes in his First Amendment evolution. But 
Hand’s authority necessarily was limited by never serving on the Supreme 
Court. His highly speech-protective Masses opinion in 1917 (which formed 
the basis for his correspondence with Holmes during the summer of 1918) 
was reversed on appeal.227 And Hand’s First Amendment vision, as 
reflected in Masses, gave way to a much different, much less speech-
protective approach as a judge on the Second Circuit, reflected in his 
opinion for the panel in United States v. Dennis, ultimately affirmed by the 
Supreme Court.228 After a “wearisome analysis” of Supreme Court 
precedent, Hand held that in “each case they must ask whether the gravity 
of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”229 This, Healy argues, smacked 
of the old “bad tendency” test, without Hand’s (or Holmes’s) earlier gloss 
that any harm be imminent as a condition of punishing speech.230 
Moreover, Healy argues, Hand’s commitment to judicial restraint trumped 
all, pushing him to reject most judicial enforcement of constitutional rights 
and most instances of courts invalidating the acts of elected legislators.231 
By contrast, Gerald Gunther, as Hand’s biographer, is far more solicitous 
of Hand’s First Amendment position. He insists that Hand adhered to his 
Masses formula, but was hamstrung by erroneous Supreme Court precedent 
that he could not change and which forced him to reject the free speech 
arguments in Dennis.232 
A third possibility is Black, whose First Amendment absolutism (under 
which “‘no law’ means no law,” “without any ifs, buts, or whereases”)233 
outflanked Brennan in many areas, including defamation. As Black 
concurred in New York Times, the First Amendment not only “delimits” 
(Brennan’s word234) a state’s power to award damages to public officials 
against critics of their official conduct, it “completely prohibit[s]” the 
exercise of such power.235 But Black could not always get other Justices to 
come along with him. As Levine and Wermiel show in several early 
 
227.  Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), rev’g 244 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 
1917); supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
228.  United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
229.  Id. at 212. 
230.  HEALY, supra note 2, at 247–48. 
231.  Id. at 248. 
232.  GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 604–05. But cf. Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly 
Killed Judicial Restraint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2141 (2014) (criticizing Gunther’s biography 
for “turn[ing] Hand into a civil libertarian and constitutional law scholar”—in other words, for 
“turn[ing] Hand into Gunther”). 
233.  Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553, 559 (1962). 
234.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
235.  Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring). 
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progeny cases, Black continued to adhere to his position of absolute 
immunity from liability, even at the risk of a majority.236 More importantly, 
Black notoriously shifted rightward in his later years on the Court, 
primarily on criminal procedure issues, but also in free speech cases 
involving civil rights sit-ins and demonstrations.237 
Surprisingly, however, Healy never mentions a fourth possibility—
William Brennan. Brennan would be intimately identified with the First 
Amendment for New York Times (and its progeny) alone.238 Beyond that 
case, he was a consistent vote in favor of free speech claimants—in thirty-
five years on the Court, it may be easier to enumerate the few cases in 
which he did not accept the speech-protective position.239 
There are admittedly several limitations on anointing Brennan as the 
one to lead the First Amendment charge absent Holmes’s change of mind. 
The first involves the inherent folly of counter-factual inquiry.240 Brennan 
was not painting on a blank canvas. He had a First Amendment foundation 
on which to build via the Court’s common law decision-making 
processes,241 some of it laid by post-Abrams Holmes; to remove Holmes is 
to remove that foundation. Healy acknowledges as much with respect to 
Black.242 Of course, this means no modern Justice could pass that test.243 
Timing is everything; as Ronald Collins puts it, “[o]ne of the main reasons 
Holmes is considered the father of modern free speech jurisprudence is 
 
236.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 117; see, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 
U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 
170 (1967) (Black, J., concurring in the result and dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 
(1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
237.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 287–88; see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN 
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303 (2000); see, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 
(1967) (Justice Black provided fifth vote affirming conviction of civil rights protesters for violating 
injunction prohibiting protest); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Black, J., for the Court) 
(affirming trespass convictions of students demonstrating outside county jail); Bell v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting from decision reversing trespassing convictions of sit-in 
demonstrators). 
238.  POWE, supra note 237, at 304. 
239.  See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (joining majority opinion upholding ban on corporate election expenditures); First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting from opinion declaring unconstitutional state limits on corporate campaign expression); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (joining majority opinion affirming constitutionality of 
prohibition on destroying draft-registration cards). 
240.  See, e.g., RICHARD J. EVANS, ALTERED PASTS: COUNTERFACTUALS IN HISTORY (2013); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What if Counterfactuals Never Existed?, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119357/altered-pasts-reviewed-cass-r-sunstein. 
241.  See Strauss, supra note 129, at 33. 
242.  Healy, supra note 217. 
243.  See Sunstein, supra note 240 (arguing that some counterfactuals are beneficial and 
inevitable in trying to explain events). 
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because he wrote what he did, when he did, and voted as he did in Abrams 
and its progeny.”244 
Second, and the flipside to the timing question, we do not know how 
Holmes would have responded to the very different forms of expression 
that Brennan encountered a half-century later. Healy shows Holmes’s 
impatience and even distaste for the radical socialist, communist, unionist, 
anti-capitalist, and anarchist speech around him, even from his surrogate 
son, Laski. How would the Brahmin Holmes have reacted to pornography, 
profane comedy routines, provocative literature, and civil rights marches? 
How would the thrice-wounded Civil War veteran have viewed burning 
flags, lies about military honors, and offensive protests outside soldiers’ 
funerals? Such uncertainty is inherent in the way any later Justice builds on 
the opinions and ideas of those before him. Holmes had to begin the free-
speech revolution in Abrams at the right’s core—political dissent and 
policy dissent prosecuted for seditious libel—with Brennan tackling an 
analogous threat to that core in New York Times. Having done so, Brennan 
was freer to expand those basic ideas to a wider range of expression, often 
far from that core. As Kalven explains, Brennan channeled Holmes to 
isolate the First Amendment’s “central meaning” of protecting political 
dissent, while understanding that this was not the “whole meaning” of the 
Amendment and that other speech was protected beyond that center.245 
Brennan had the fortuity of serving on the Court at a point in which he 
could expand the right away from the core and out to the margins. 
A final limitation is singular to Brennan—his desire and ability to forge 
Court majorities and coalitions. That willingness to compromise in search 
of coalitions and to focus on the creation of workable doctrine that could 
pull his colleagues along is precisely why he was better able to create 
binding First Amendment law than the more absolutist Black.246 On the 
other hand, that desire sometimes prompted him to abandon constitutional 
clarity or constitutional principles, even on the First Amendment, for fear 
of losing a majority.247 Much again depends on timing. As discussed 
previously, Brennan was at the height of his powers in the mid-1960s, 
approximately a decade into his service on the Court, when Goldberg’s 
presence guaranteed a majority for the civil libertarian position.248 That 
certain majority was gone by 1970, as was the ease with which Brennan 
 
244.  Collins, supra note 2, at 378. 
245.  Kalven, supra note 24, at 208. 
246.  POWE, supra note 237, at 303; Segall, supra note 95 (quoting Judge Richard Posner, a 
former Brennan clerk, describing Brennan’s willingness to compromise as his strength that “made it 
much easier for him to get a majority than it would have been for more ‘principled’ justices”). 
247.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 545; id. at 263 (describing criticism that Brennan 
“would change votes to get a result”). 
248.  See POWE, supra note 237, at 303–04; supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
5 WASSERMAN 797-854 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:38 AM 
834 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:3:797 
could get his desired outcomes. He never again wrote for the Court in a 
progeny case after Rosenbloom (a plurality, not a majority) in 1971.249 In 
his later years on the Court, he often found himself writing separately, just 
as Holmes had. 
Nevertheless, Brennan led efforts to enhance the freedom of speech 
across several issues and areas, whether writing majority opinions or strong 
concurrences and dissents attempting to create a body of speech-protective 
rules. This Part considers five doctrinal areas defined by high-profile, 
highly speech-protective Brennan opinions and efforts. 
A. Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct 
If we are to link Holmes to Brennan in driving a speech-protective 
vision of the First Amendment, it is appropriate to begin with incitement 
and advocacy of unlawful conduct. This was the expression at issue in the 
Court’s earliest free speech cases (in which the speech claimants all lost), 
in Holmes’s clear-and-present danger test in Schenck, and in Holmes’s 
change of heart in Abrams. 
Fifty years after Abrams, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio restated 
and reconstructed the test for unprotected incitement, without ever using 
the words “clear and present danger.”250 In a state criminal syndicalism 
prosecution of a Ku Klux Klan leader over statements at a public rally, the 
Court held that “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”251 This standard reflected the modern evolution of First 
Amendment doctrine, which now distinguished “abstract teaching” of the 
need for violent action from preparing and steeling a group to such 
action.252 The Ohio statute and conviction, which made no distinction 
between “mere advocacy” and incitement to imminent lawless action, 
could not stand.253 
Although Brandenburg was published as a per curiam opinion, 
Brennan’s hand is recognized and significant. The opinion originally had 
been assigned to Fortas, who resigned in May 1969, after his draft had 
circulated but before the opinion was announced. Brennan took over the 
opinion and made one significant change—rather than Fortas’s requirement 
 
249.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 125; supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
250.  See 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 
251.  Id. at 447. 
252.  Id. at 447–48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)). 
253.  Id. at 448–49. 
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(modeled on Holmes) that speech be “attended by present danger that such 
action may in fact be provoked,” Brennan insisted that speech be “likely” 
to incite or produce such action.254 
One Brennan biographer labeled this a “clean break” from clear-and-
present danger; whatever the standard’s Holmesian origins, the Court 
(except, of course, for Holmes and Brandeis in non-majority opinions) had 
never applied it to truly protect vigorous dissenting speech.255 Brennan 
similarly failed to even mention clear-and-present danger in New York 
Times, which Harry Kalven took as a sign that the test, at least in those 
words and with their presumed meaning, had disappeared from First 
Amendment jurisprudence.256 Five years later, Brennan proved him correct 
in the realm of incitement and advocacy of unlawful conduct, perhaps 
hoping the new language would reflect a new, more speech-protective 
attitude. 
While Brandenburg marks the most direct connection between the free 
speech opinions of Holmes and Brennan, it may be the least significant area 
for modern speech. The Court has not decided a true clear-and-present 
danger case in more than forty years.257 The more recent focus is not on 
speech urging listeners to break the law, but rather on “true threats,” in 
which a speaker threatens unlawful harm to a listener.258 Instead, clear-and-
present danger stands for a general requirement of temporal imminence 
between speech and harm, providing rhetorical justification for what David 
Strauss calls the “persuasion principle”—speech cannot be regulated out of 
fear that it might persuade listeners to act in a (lawful) way that 
government may not like.259 
B. Free Speech and the Civil Rights Movement 
New York Times was a civil rights case.260 The editorial advertisement 
at issue—titled “Heed Their Rising Voices”—described civil rights protests 
on a college campus in Montgomery and over-officious police responses to 
 
254.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 318; see Morton J. Horwitz, In Memoriam: William J. 
Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 23, 28 (1997). 
255.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 318. 
256.  Kalven, supra note 24, at 213–14. 
257.  Collins, supra note 2, at 376. 
258.  See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 
(2003). 
259.  David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
334, 338–39 (1991). 
260.  Kalven, supra note 24, 192; Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren 
Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79. 
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them, and sought public and financial support for the movement.261 The 
events occurred during the period of “massive resistance” to Brown v. 
Board of Education262 and organized counterattacks against efforts to undo 
Southern apartheid.263 Sullivan sued not only the Times, but also four 
African-American civil rights leaders who had signed the ad.264 And while 
the Times had gotten a stay of the $500,000 judgment pending appeal, the 
individual defendants had not, so Sullivan sought to collect on the 
judgment against them by attaching their real and personal property.265 Nor 
was this an isolated case. Sullivan’s was one of five defamation actions 
filed in response to “Heed,” seeking a total of $3 million.266 And those five 
lawsuits were part of a larger coordinated effort by Alabama officials 
statewide to use libel litigation to silence the Civil Rights Movement and 
the national press covering it,267 perhaps with explicit approval by some 
state judges.268 By the early 1960s, the Times faced potential libel 
judgments approaching $300 million.269 New York Times was essential to 
ending this practice and to protecting both civil rights protesters and the 
national media covering them. 
This context is critical to the outcome in New York Times and to the 
Court’s willingness to discard years of state defamation law in the name of 
free speech.270 The context also explains a significant, but overlooked, 
component of First Amendment protection established in the case—the 
power of independent appellate review over constitutional facts (such as 
actual malice, “of and concerning,” and falsity) through which the Court 
itself determined that Sullivan could not prevail on his claim.271 Although 
the Court remanded to state court, it had done all the necessary fact-
finding, leaving the lower court nothing meaningful to do but enter 
 
261.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–57 (1964); LEWIS, supra note 124, at 
5–8; Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, reprinted in LEWIS, supra note 124, 
at 2–3. 
262.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
263.  See LEWIS, supra note 124, at 19–22; Wasserman, supra note 124, at 909. 
264.  All four were Alabama citizens and it is generally agreed that Sullivan sued them, but none 
of the other signatories of the ad, to destroy diversity of citizenship and keep the case in Alabama state 
court and out of federal district court. Wasserman, supra note 164, at 905–06. 
265.  LEWIS, supra note 124, at 43–44. 
266.  Id. at 12–14; Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in FIRST 
AMENDMENT STORIES 229, 237 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012). 
267.  LEWIS, supra note 124, at 35–36. 
268.  Id. at 26. 
269.  Papandrea, supra note 266, at 237–38. 
270.  But see Cass, supra note 141, at 410 (“The decision’s strength in First Amendment theory 
was matched by its weakness in judicial decision-making, particularly its infidelity to decisional 
constraints evidenced in Brennan’s casting off the lines of historical understanding of the Amendment’s 
meaning.”). 
271.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 285–88 (1964); Wasserman, supra note 
124, at 913. 
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judgment for defendants.272 Clearly, the Justices did not trust a Southern 
state court to play any role in determining the rights of the speakers in this 
case.273 
But the Court’s concern for civil rights was not limited to New York 
Times. Some of the Warren Court’s most important First Amendment 
jurisprudence arose in that same cauldron of the movement and the public 
protests that defined it.274 Brown aside (and certainly never to understate 
the power of Brown), the movement might have produced more significant 
free speech law than equal protection law, at least from the Supreme 
Court.275 The Court offered broad protection to the rights to publicly 
protest,276 sit-in on private property,277 organize and associate for political 
purposes,278 advocate,279 and speak anonymously,280 all from cases 
involving demonstrations (in the South and elsewhere) against race 
discrimination, segregation, and denial of voting rights.281 
Two Brennan opinions stand out in this area. One is NAACP v. 
Button,282 which reflects as significant and important an expansion of the 
First Amendment as either Holmes’s Abrams dissent or Brennan’s New 
York Times majority. Button, decided in 1963, established that the state 
cannot foreclose constitutional scrutiny of its laws by the “mere labels” that 
it places on some speech or conduct;283 that “the First Amendment also 
protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental 
 
272.  Wasserman, supra note 124, at 913. 
273.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 20. 
274.  See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 71, at 6; TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: 
PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 47–49 (2009); Kalven, supra note 24, at 
192–93; Neuborne, supra note 260, at 77–82. 
275.  The dominant pieces of equality protection came from Congress through the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Brennan helped ensure that the Court avoided any 
Equal Protection pronouncements that might derail those legislative efforts. See POWE, supra note 237, 
at 228–29. The Court ultimately was called on to assess (and uphold) the constitutionality of these laws, 
although again by talking not about equal protection but about interstate commerce. See Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964). 
276.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 
(1966) (plurality opinion); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 
229 (1963). 
277.  Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). See generally CLARK, supra note 102, at 220–25 
(describing handling of sit-in cases, which deeply divided the Court). 
278.  See, e.g., Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
279.  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452 (1963). 
280.  See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
281.  See ZICK, supra note 274, at 47; Neuborne, supra note 260, at 77–82. 
282.  371 U.S. 415 (1963); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, Richard Posner & NAACP v. Button—
A Short History, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 18, 2014), http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2014/06/richard-posner-naacp-v-button-a-short-history.html. 
283.  Button, 371 U.S. at 429. 
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intrusion”;284 and that “First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to 
survive.”285 Brennan emphasized those ideas one year later in New York 
Times. 
At issue in Button were state laws prohibiting lawyer solicitation, as 
applied to the NAACP and its efforts to locate parents to serve as plaintiffs 
in school-desegregation actions. Lawyers would speak at NAACP-
sponsored meetings, often asking parents to authorize someone (sometimes 
that lawyer, sometimes a lawyer-to-be-named-later) to initiate litigation on 
that parent’s behalf. But Virginia had redefined prohibitions on “runners” 
and “cappers” to include any “agent for an individual or organization which 
retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and 
in which it has no pecuniary right or liability.”286 
In an opinion for five Justices, Brennan extended the First Amendment 
to protect the NAACP’s litigation strategies and practices as “a form of 
political expression”; they reflected “a means for achieving the lawful 
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and 
local, for the members of the Negro community in this country.”287 
Litigation was a way for groups and individuals, having been unable to 
achieve their objectives in the political arena, to associate and attempt to 
achieve those objectives in the courts—in effect, civil rights organizations 
were doing what New Deal opponents had done, without inhibition, thirty 
years earlier.288 The Court already had made clear that the First 
Amendment protected peaceful organized group activity; litigation was 
simply one more such activity.289 Virginia’s interest in regulating the legal 
profession did not justify regulating the NAACP’s activities; the group’s 
politically motivated litigation efforts bore no resemblance to the type of 
unethical attorney conduct ordinarily justifying prohibition—there was no 
profit motive, no showing of conflicts of interest, no showing that the 
organization prevented anyone from obtaining other counsel, and no 
showing that it prevented competing lawyers from finding clients to take 
such cases.290 The law also was so broad as to effectively eliminate all 
group litigation, particularly on politically and socially unpopular positions 
and issues.291 
 
284.  Id. 
285.  Id. at 433. 
286.  Id. at 423. 
287.  Id. at 429. 
288.  Id. at 429–30. 
289.  Id. at 430–31. 
290.  Id. at 442–44. 
291.  Id. at 435–36; see also CLARK, supra note 102, at 218–20; KALVEN, supra note 71, at 87–
88; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 214–15. 
5 WASSERMAN 797-854 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:38 AM 
2016] Holmes and Brennan 839 
Button, and Brennan’s authorship of it, was a fortuitous product of the 
Warren Court’s evolving membership in the early 1960s. The case first 
came to the Court during October Term 1960; the Court divided 5–4 in 
favor of upholding the law, with Frankfurter writing the majority and Black 
writing a dissent for himself and Warren, Douglas, and Brennan. But the 
case was held over in the spring of 1961, when Frankfurter and Charles 
Whittaker left the Court. It returned in October Term 1962, with President 
Kennedy having appointed Goldberg and White. Following reargument, the 
5–4 divide now was to declare the laws invalid, with Goldberg joining the 
original dissenters to form a majority and White concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.292 
Commentators celebrate Button as a First Amendment landmark, 
seeing it as more practically significant than New York Times, although 
lacking the same reputation or regard. Button took the First Amendment to 
a new place, offering what Kalven calls “a generous view of the range of 
First Amendment protection, a view which seems to me [to be] 
indisputably correct although the Court had never previously been given an 
appropriate occasion for announcing it.”293 The decision obviously boosted 
immediate NAACP efforts in the South,294 but it also endorsed and 
breathed constitutional life into a particular model of public-interest and 
law-reform litigation.295 
In fact, Kalven suggests that the opinion’s real weakness was that 
Brennan did not “stand on his First Amendment point” and hold that all 
recruiting for all constitutional litigation is constitutionally protected 
activity, relying instead on the potential application of vague and overbroad 
state law to innocuous activities.296 Brennan could have gone further, had 
he “had the courage of his First Amendment convictions.”297 Once again, it 
may return to Brennan’s desire to hold together a majority, an especially 
salient concern in this case, in which the outcome depended on changes in 
personnel producing changes in outcome. 
The second Civil Rights Movement case is even more telling as a 
measure of Brennan’s bona fides as a leader in efforts to protect free 
speech. Walker v. City of Birmingham298 held that civil rights protesters 
could not use the appeal of a contempt conviction to challenge the 
 
292.  MICHAL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 339 (2004); STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 214; Collins, supra 
note 282. 
293.  KALVEN, supra note 71, at 82–83; see Collins, supra note 282. 
294.  See CLARK, supra note 102, at 219. 
295.  Collins, supra note 282. 
296.  KALVEN, supra note 71, at 86; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433–34 (1963). 
297.  KALVEN, supra note 71, at 85. 
298.  388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
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constitutionality of even a facially invalid underlying injunction, marking 
the one time the Court rebuffed civil rights advocates’ First Amendment 
arguments.299 Brennan authored one of three dissents. 
Anticipating protests during Easter Week in 1963, Birmingham 
officials obtained an ex parte state court injunction prohibiting leaders from 
encouraging or participating in mass parades or mass processions without 
obtaining a permit, as required by a constitutionally dubious local law that 
the court copied into its injunction. Despite the injunction, marches went 
forward on Good Friday and Easter Sunday.300 Protest leaders never sought 
to comply with the injunction by seeking a permit and never moved to 
dissolve or appeal it as constitutionally defective—both of which likely 
would have been futile. Writing for the Court, in an opinion joined by 
Black (thus highlighting his shift away from absolute protection for speech, 
at least in some contexts301), Justice Stewart accepted the state procedural 
rule that a person subject to an injunction cannot ignore the injunction and 
then challenge it in opposing a contempt citation; he must obey the court 
order unless he can successfully dissolve it or have it reversed on appeal.302 
The Court declined to find a constitutional exception or limitation on that 
rule or to read the First Amendment to mean that people “were 
constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their 
battle to the streets.”303 
Brennan’s dissent, joined by Warren, Douglas, and Fortas, emphasized 
that the First Amendment only can survive in a system in which people 
have “the right to speak first and challenge later,”304 meaning to speak in 
the face of a restriction on speech, then challenge the restriction if the state 
chooses to penalize that expression ex post. He rejected the “inscrutable 
legerdemain” by which that principle could be altered simply because 
government first took the time to have a judge issue a constitutionally 
defective ex parte judicial order reciting the words of a constitutionally 
defective ordinance.305 The First Amendment limits both legislative and 
judicial power—if speech cannot be punished, it cannot be punished as 
contempt of an ex parte injunction or as a violation of a legislative 
enactment.306 By saying otherwise, the majority created a “devastatingly 
 
299.  Neuborne, supra note 260, at 80; see also CLARK, supra note 102, at 241 (arguing that the 
decision sent a bad message to civil rights advocates, who questioned whether the courts were reliable 
allies in their cause). 
300.  Walker, 388 U.S. at 309–11. 
301.  See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 289. 
302.  Walker, 388 U.S. at 313–15. 
303.  Id. at 321. 
304.  Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
305.  Id. at 345–46. 
306.  Id. at 349. 
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destructive weapon” with “complete invulnerability” that can be used to 
stifle public expression and infringe essential public freedoms.307 
Although events giving rise to Walker occurred in 1963, Brennan saw 
the case and the majority opinion in the broader social and political milieu 
at the time of the decision in 1967. By that point, riots, Vietnam, and rising 
militancy within the Civil Rights Movement had dampened Northern 
(white) sympathy for civil rights protesters308 and patience for the public 
disorder associated with public protest.309 In Blasian terms, the fear that led 
to Southern efforts to restrain the Civil Rights Movement had reflected a 
local pathology;310 in protecting speech claimants in those earlier cases, the 
Court functioned as a national institution remaining above a limited 
pathology.311 By 1967, with unrest extending north and the tenor of the 
movement changing, the pathology had nationalized. And, unfortunately, 
the Court responded in Walker much as it had during the national 
pathologies of World War I and the post-War Red Scare. At least in this 
case, Brennan found himself playing the same dissenting role that Holmes 
had played in Abrams and subsequent Red Scare cases. 
Brennan highlighted those broader social concerns in the closing 
paragraph of his dissent, insisting that the altered context should not alter 
the scope of the First Amendment or the right of public protest. “We cannot 
permit fears of ‘riots’ and ‘civil disobedience’ generated by slogans like 
‘Black Power’ to divert our attention from what is here at stake—not 
violence or the right of the State to control its streets and sidewalks,” but 
protection of First Amendment rights.312 In fact, that closing reflected 
greatly modulated language. In earlier drafts, Brennan explicitly reminded 
readers that the case was about a protest from 1963, “before ‘Black Power’ 
and ‘Long Hot Summer’ became part of the jargon of the civil rights 
movement.”313 When Warren said he could not join the dissent if those 
references to current events remained, Brennan, a coalition-builder even in 
dissent, modified his language.314 
 
307.  Id. at 346–47, 349. 
308.  See CLARK, supra note 102, at 241; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 289–90. 
309.  ZICK, supra note 274, at 52. 
310.  Blasi, supra note 133, at 451. 
311.  Id. at 451, 509. 
312.  Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 349 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
313.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 290. 
314.  Id. 
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C. Flag Burning 
Brennan’s opinions for the Court in the two flag-burning cases315 
represent his final notable First Amendment victory.316 Through his 
opinions for the Court, Brennan controlled the outcome of one of the most 
heated, if not practically significant, political and expressive debates of the 
day. 
The American flag became part of the national political agenda by 
accident in the late 1980s. During the 1988 presidential election, then-Vice 
President and Republican presidential nominee George H.W. Bush made a 
political issue out of the Democratic candidate, former Massachusetts 
Governor Michael Dukakis, vetoing a Massachusetts bill that would have 
required public school teachers to lead students in daily recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance. Combined with Dukakis’s “card-carrying 
member[ship]” in the ACLU, the flag and patriotism became topics of 
presidential politics and national debate.317 
The following June, the Court decided Johnson,318 a prosecution under 
Texas’s flag-burning prohibition, arising from events at the 1984 
Republican National Convention in Dallas. Writing for a five-Justice 
majority,319 Brennan began by concluding that burning a flag is conduct 
“‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication’ to implicate the 
First Amendment.”320 The government asserted two interests in support of 
the law—preventing breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a 
symbol of nationhood and national unity. The first interest was not 
implicated, as there was no record of any breaches of the peace and the 
Court refused to treat flag burning as fighting words.321 The second interest 
was implicated, but was related to the suppression of expression, in that the 
interest was endangered only when burning the flag conveyed a message 
that the government did not like.322 
Brennan then concluded that while this second interest was compelling, 
the law could not survive strict scrutiny. “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
 
315.  United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
316.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 271–73. 
317.  Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 718–19 (2004). 
318.  491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
319.  O’Connor initially was a sixth vote with Brennan, but she changed her mind, without 
explanation, and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 526. 
320.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
409 (1974)). 
321.  Id. at 409–10. 
322.  Id. at 410. 
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offensive or disagreeable.”323 This, of course, recalls Holmes’s ideal of 
“freedom for the thought that we hate.”324 The government had never been 
permitted to prohibit particular uses of any symbol so as to limit the views 
expressed through that symbol, and the Court declined to create any 
American flag exception to the “joust of principles protected by the First 
Amendment.”325 
Brennan closed the opinion in Holmesian326 fashion: 
We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag’s deservedly cherished 
place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our 
holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of 
freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the 
conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson’s is a 
sign and source of our strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images 
of our flag, the one immortalized in our own national anthem, is of 
the bombardment it survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation’s 
resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected in the flag—and 
it is that resilience that we reassert today. . . . And, precisely 
because it is our flag that is involved, one’s response to the flag 
burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. 
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag 
than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s 
message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of 
preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by—as one 
witness here did—according its remains a respectful burial. We do 
not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so 
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.327 
The negative reaction to Brennan’s opinion was swift and unexpected, 
even by a Justice who by that point had spent thirty-three years on the 
Court. Conservative talk-radio listeners mailed flags to his chambers and a 
neighbor draped an American flag over his front door in Brennan’s plain 
view.328 The Senate, by a 97–3 vote, passed a resolution condemning the 
decision, and the House passed a similar resolution expressing “profound 
concern.”329 Amid calls from President Bush and members of Congress for 
 
323.  Id. at 414. 
324.  United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
325.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415–18. 
326.  He also may have been going for Justice Jackson and his majority opinion in W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). 
327.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419–20. 
328.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 527. 
329.  Id.; Daniel H. Pollitt, The Flag Burning Controversy: A Chronology, 70 N.C. L. REV. 553, 
571 (1992). 
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a constitutional amendment to overturn Johnson, Congress enacted the Flag 
Protection Act of 1989330 on overwhelming bipartisan votes in both 
houses.331 The Act flatly banned all desecration of the flag (including 
mutilating, defacing, physically defiling, burning, maintaining on the 
ground, or trampling), except for disposal of a worn or soiled flag, for any 
reason and with any motive or purpose.332 
With Brennan writing for the same 5–4 split, the Court held in 
Eichman that the federal Act violated the First Amendment.333 Although 
the law prohibited all flag desecration, regardless of the speaker’s motive 
or message, the government’s asserted interest—maintaining respect for the 
flag as a symbol—remained related to the suppression of expression 
because of its content.334 This could be seen in the statute’s text, which 
prohibited only conduct (mutilating, defacing, defiling) that “unmistakably 
connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on those 
acts likely to damage the flag’s symbolic value,” while still permitting 
respectful disposal by burning.335 Because the federal law remained 
content-based, Johnson and the First Amendment principles espoused there 
controlled. And Brennan again closed with high rhetoric, insisting that 
“[p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes 
this emblem so revered, and worth revering.”336 
Now the only option was a constitutional amendment, the push for 
which began when “[t]he ink had hardly dried on the Eichman opinion.”337 
Within less than a month, a proposed amendment fell thirty-four votes 
short of the necessary supermajority in the House and nine votes short in 
the Senate.338 By the time Brennan announced his retirement in July, his 
final free speech victory appeared safe—at least for the moment. Flag 
desecration silently remains the free speech issue that will not die. 
Proposals for a constitutional amendment have been made in one or both 
houses in every Congress since the 104th (the first of the Gingrich 
Revolution) in which Republicans have controlled one or both houses. 
Several proposals have passed the House; none have passed the Senate, 
although the closest, in the 109th Congress, fell one vote short.339 
 
330.  Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777. 
331.  Pollitt, supra note 329, at 575. 
332.  United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314–15 (1990) (quoting statute). 
333.  Id. at 318–19. 
334.  Id. at 315–16. 
335.  Id. at 317. 
336.  Id. at 319. 
337.  Pollitt, supra note 329, at 589. 
338.  Id. at 606–07, 612. 
339.  S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006) (final vote of 66–34). 
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Ironically, for all the criticism and vitriol initially directed at Brennan, 
the flag burning cases no longer are intimately associated with their author. 
Instead, the decisions are better remembered for the surprising line-ups—
the normally liberal Stevens dissented,340 while originalist Antonin Scalia 
joined the majority.341 In fact, Johnson has become far more associated 
with Scalia than Brennan—twenty-five years later, it remains the singular 
(if not the only) example of how Scalia’s textual originalism did not 
invariably produce constitutional outcomes matching his conservative 
political preferences.342 
D. Obscenity and Sexually Explicit Speech 
Other than New York Times, the First Amendment area most regularly 
associated with Brennan is obscenity. For more than a decade he wrote the 
lion’s share of opinions for the Court, likely because no one else wanted to 
write them and Warren had no one else to assign them to.343 Brennan was 
never a First Amendment absolutist,344 never more obviously than with 
respect to sexually explicit material, which he believed an 
“abomination.”345 And Warren, who similarly disliked this content, 
immediately identified Brennan as the Justice who could figure out how to 
strike the proper balance between First Amendment freedoms and the 
ability of society to protect itself from “smut-peddlers.”346 
In 1957, Brennan wrote for the Court in Roth v. United States.347 He 
accepted the longstanding idea that obscenity is a category of speech 
entirely without First Amendment protection.348 But that still left to the 
 
340.  Although Stevens often departed from Brennan’s First Amendment vision on New York 
Times issues. See LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 364. 
341.  See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 526 (discussing Brennan’s early relations with 
Scalia). Kennedy also joined Brennan in the majority in both cases, which seemed surprising at the time 
(just two years after Kennedy’s appointment to the court) but has proven perfectly consistent with 
Kennedy’s speech-protective judicial philosophy. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact remains that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the 
fundamental meaning of the Constitution. So I agree with the Court that he must go free.”); supra note 
192–193 and accompanying text. 
342.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 17 (2012); Volokh, supra note 193, at 1196–97; Howard Wasserman, Scalia, Judicial Ideology, 
and Flag Burning, PRAWFSBLAWG, Aug. 31, 2012, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/ 
08/stop-talking-about-flag-burning.html. 
343.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 182–83; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 123. 
344.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 183. 
345.  Id. at 187, 189. 
346.  Id. at 185; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 123. 
347.  354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
348.  Id. at 481–85; Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2166, 2171 (2015). But see id. at 2168, 2177 (questioning the historical basis for the distinctions 
between protected and unprotected categories of speech). 
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Court the task of defining precisely what obscenity is and to clearly 
demarcate the constitutional boundary between protected and unprotected 
expression.349 Importantly, Brennan recognized that “sex and obscenity are 
not synonymous. . . . Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human 
life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind 
through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and 
public concern.”350 Speech thus was not obscene simply because it dealt 
with sex. 
Instead, speech only was obscene, and thus unprotected, where it 
lacked “even the slightest redeeming social importance” and “to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest.”351 Brennan eventually refined Roth into a three-part test, defining 
obscenity as material 
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards 
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and 
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.352 
Although the Court affirmed the convictions of the defendants in the 
consolidated cases (one on federal charges, the other on state charges),353 
free speech advocates widely cheered the decision, believing the sharpened 
and narrowed definition of obscenity would rein in censors, keeping them 
from suppressing art, literature, science, and political material dealing with 
sex and sexuality.354 Of course, this was not enough for Douglas and Black, 
who dissented in favor of giving “the broad sweep of the First Amendment 
full support,” leaving no room for unique treatment of “noxious 
literature.”355 And it was too much for John Marshall Harlan, who feared 
Roth “may result in a loosening of the tight reins which state and federal 
courts should hold upon the enforcement of obscenity statutes.”356 
For the next sixteen years, the Court attempted to apply this standard in 
a series of cases, many of them authored by Brennan; most reversed 
 
349.  Roth, 354 U.S. at 488; Lakier, supra note 348, at 2208. 
350.  Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. 
351.  Id. at 484, 489. 
352.  Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
353.  Roth, 354 U.S. at 489, 494. 
354.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 190–91. 
355.  Roth, 354 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). 
356.  Id. at 496 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). 
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obscenity convictions, usually through pluralities357 and ultimately through 
per curiam opinions,358 while some affirmed.359 This period is best 
remembered for the farce of “dirty movie days,” when the Justices (except 
Black and Douglas) watched the challenged pornographic movies in the 
Court basement.360 The decisional high point remains Jacobellis v. Ohio, in 
which Justice Stewart threw up his hands in a concurring opinion; he could 
not define obscenity, but famously insisted “I know it when I see it, and the 
motion picture involved in this case is not that.”361 
Brennan ultimately came to question whether he could ever create a 
workable legal standard that simultaneously allowed for regulation of 
obscenity and protected free speech.362 Finally, he had enough. Roth 
“cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing 
fundamental First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time 
has come to make a significant departure.”363 The “outright suppression of 
obscenity cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments,” because the Court had “failed to formulate a 
standard that sharply distinguishes protected from unprotected speech.”364 
Any test the Court could develop was too vague to provide sufficient notice 
of what material is protected, thereby producing a chill on expression and 
putting stress on the judiciary to figure it all out.365 
Tellingly, however, Brennan was unwilling to follow Douglas (Black 
had by this point retired) in holding that the First Amendment categorically 
barred suppression of any sexually oriented expression.366 Instead, Brennan 
relied, essentially, on strict scrutiny. He would treat sexually explicit 
material as a category of protected speech, then examine whether the 
government possessed a substantial interest justifying its suppression.367 He 
further insisted that while states may have strong interests in protecting 
juveniles and non-consenting adults from exposure to such material, they 
 
357.  Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 
(1964) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
358.  Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam). 
359.  Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Brennan, J., for the Court); Mishkin v. New 
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (Brennan, J., for the Court); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) 
(Brennan, J., for the Court). 
360.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 203–04. 
361.  Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
362.  CLARK, supra note 102, at 199; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 365–66. 
363.  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73–74 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
CLARK, supra note 102, at 204–05; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 7, at 366. 
364.  Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
365.  Id. at 93. 
366.  Id. at 102–03. 
367.  See id. at 103. 
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had no interest in regulating the reading and viewing habits of consenting 
adults substantial enough to justify suppressing the material.368 
The parallels between Holmes and Brennan are clearest in their 
journeys on political dissent and obscenity, respectively. Holmes’s initial 
resistance to protecting speech was grounded in distaste for the antics of 
dissenting anarchists and unionists; Brennan’s initial resistance as to 
obscenity was similarly driven by an intense dislike for pornography smut 
peddlers. Like Holmes, Brennan changed his mind, coming to recognize 
limits on what government can do to squelch speech that it does not like. 
And like Holmes, Brennan ended the day in dissent on the issue, where he 
stayed for the remainder of his time on the Court, continuing to insist that 
any regulation of obscenity as to consenting adults is facially 
unconstitutional.369 
The evolution of the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence from Roth also 
parallels the Court’s defamation jurisprudence from New York Times. As to 
both, Brennan authored an opinion that accepted a theory of the First 
Amendment in which some speech is categorically unprotected, then 
sought to narrowly and sharply confine its unprotected contours. As to 
both, the Court then spent years figuring out how to elaborate and apply 
that decision through its process of common law constitutionalism. In fact, 
as the early consensus on New York Times unraveled, several Justices 
recognized the parallel with obscenity, expressing concern that defamation 
would repeat the same mistakes—where differing views and plurality 
opinions would prevent the Court from providing sufficient constitutional 
guidance.370 
And as to both, Brennan neither entirely succeeded nor entirely failed 
in guiding the doctrine. The Progeny reveals that although defamation 
jurisprudence did not go precisely where Brennan would have liked,371 
particularly after Gertz, New York Times remains a vigorous and highly 
protective part of First Amendment jurisprudence, largely reflecting 
Brennan’s constitutional goals. While Brennan did not succeed in guiding 
obscenity doctrine in the same way, he did not entirely fail either. Even 
under the less-protective Miller372 test that Brennan rejected,373 courts have 
never returned to the pre-Roth era in which art, literature, science, and 
 
368.  Id. at 107–14. 
369.  See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 507–08 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wood v. 
Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 274–75 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
application of the child pornography prohibition to images having serious literary, artistic, scientific, or 
medical value would violate the First Amendment). 
370.  LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 8, at 50, 74. 
371.  See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 172 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
372.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973). 
373.  See id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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political speech were regularly targeted for obscenity prosecution.374 And 
the rise of the Internet and the wide availability of all manner of 
pornographic and sexually explicit speech confirms that society, if not 
doctrine, has followed Brennan’s lead. 
Having come around to greater protection for sexually explicit speech, 
Brennan naturally opposed efforts to regulate speech that could not be 
obscene even under Miller. Consider his dissent in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation.375 The Court upheld a prohibition on indecent-but-not-obscene 
speech on broadcast radio and FCC fines for an afternoon broadcast of 
comedian George Carlin’s famous “Filthy Words” routine, in which he 
identified (and repeatedly uttered) the seven words that cannot be said on 
television.376 The Court emphasized the supposedly unique attributes of the 
broadcast medium—its intrusiveness into the home, its pervasiveness, and 
its easy accessibility to children—to justify regulating speech that could not 
have been punished outside that specific medium.377 
Brennan began an unusually angry dissent with the following: “I find 
the Court’s misapplication of fundamental First Amendment principles so 
patent, and its attempt to impose its notions of propriety on the whole of the 
American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain silent.”378 The 
opinion reflects several themes common to Brennan’s evolved approach to 
sexually explicit speech. One is the essential narrowness of any defined 
category of unprotected expression. Speech is regulable as obscene, even as 
to minors, only if it is in some “significant way, erotic.”379 Mere profanity 
as used in the Carlin monologue could not appeal to a prurient interest in 
sex, thus the FCC’s ban did nothing more than shield children from ideas 
government did not like.380 
Second, and related, is the freedom of willing adults to have access to 
such expression. By elevating the rights of the offended listener to avoid 
profane or offensive speech in the home (even though he could “simply 
extend his arm and switch stations or flick the ‘off’ button”), the Court 
failed to sufficiently weigh the interests of the willing listener who wanted 
to hear this expression—it permitted “majoritarian tastes completely to 
preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a receptive, 
 
374.  Edward de Grazia, How Justice Brennan Freed Novels and Movies During the Sixties, 8 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 259 (1996). See generally EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK 
EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS (1992) (describing early-
twentieth century obscenity prosecutions). 
375.  438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
376.  See id. at 729–30, 50–55 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court) for the “Filthy Words” 
transcript. 
377.  Id. at 748–49. 
378.  Id. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
379.  Id. at 767 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975)). 
380.  Id. at 767–68. 
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unoffended minority.”381 Moreover, by preventing adults from accessing 
Carlin’s monologue, the decision “violates in spades” the principle that 
adults cannot be limited only to hearing what is appropriate for children—
especially given that Brennan doubted the speech could even be kept from 
children.382 
The third theme is an exceedingly broad conception of protected and 
permissible human conversation. Brennan decried the decision’s potential 
to sweep from the public airwaves all manner of “dirty words,” regardless 
of context and regardless of artistic or political merit—potentially banning 
Shakespeare, Chaucer, Hemingway, and other great literature, as well as 
politically significant expression, such as the then-recent Nixon tapes.383 He 
quoted Holmes’s famous line about the variable, changing, and subjective 
nature of words in human conversation.384 And he recognized that Carlin’s 
monologue was itself about words and their political content, meant to 
illustrate the silliness of public attitudes about those words; by affirming 
the FCC’s power to punish the broadcast, the majority made Carlin look 
prescient with a decision validating those same silly attitudes.385 
Once again, however, Brennan’s position has arguably prevailed 
culturally. Even if not “harmless,”386 Pacifica certainly has not been as bad 
as it might have been. It is widely reviled.387 Although the Court has twice 
declined opportunities to reconsider or overturn the precedent,388 it has 
explicitly declined to extend its First Amendment theory to any other 
medium—including cable,389 telephone dial-in services,390 and, most 
importantly, the Internet (in an opinion by Justice Stevens, the author of the 
primary Pacifica opinion).391 Each time, the Court insisted that these media 
were sufficiently different from broadcasting with respect to those three 
 
381.  Id. at 766. 
382.  Id. at 768. 
383.  Id. at 771. 
384.  Id. at 776 (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which 
it is used.”) (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.))). 
385.  Id. at 777. 
386.  Id. (“Whether today’s decision will similarly prove ‘harmless’ remains to be seen. One can 
only hope that it will.”). 
387.  L.A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion and Pacifica: Are They Relics?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 445, 445 (2009) 
(labeling Pacifica and other broadcast-is-different cases “an embarrassment”); see also FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2321 (2012) (Fox II) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that Pacifica was wrong at the time and that time, technology, and the FCC’s 
“untenable” rules justify reconsidering the opinion). 
388.  Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) 
(Fox I). 
389.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). 
390.  Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989). 
391.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–69 (1997). 
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attributes; they thus could not be subject to the same content-based 
regulation of dirty words and non-obscene explicit speech. 
E. Student Speech 
In many areas—notably, for our purposes, New York Times—
Brennan’s First Amendment vision prevailed, explicitly or implicitly, in the 
years since his retirement. But in one area the jurisprudence has gone in the 
opposite direction—student speech. While students still do not shed their 
First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate,392 schools can and do get 
away with regulating a massive amount of student speech.393 The goal of 
this Part has been to consider additional areas in which Brennan led the 
effort for broad speech protection, even if ultimately unsuccessfully. In the 
realm of student speech, three Brennan opinions stand out. 
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,394 the Court held that a school 
could constitutionally suspend a student for a school-assembly speech laced 
with sexual innuendo, recognizing the school’s power to prohibit students’ 
use of “vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse” or “offensively 
lewd and indecent speech,” as well as its power to decide for itself what 
constituted such terms.395 Brennan agreed that the school could punish the 
plaintiff, although he concurred only in the judgment. He tried to reign in 
the reach of the majority opinion, keeping the case in the student-speech 
framework created by Tinker, under which a school could punish this 
speech because it was “materially disruptive” of the high-school 
assembly.396 But he insisted that, absent such disruption, the student could 
not have been punished simply because the content was (in the view of 
school administrators) “inappropriate” or “offensive” or because school 
officials disagreed with its substance.397 This gambit has proved 
unsuccessful, as Fraser has come to mean that lewd and sexual speech 
 
392.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
393.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (“The First Amendment does not 
require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes” to dangers such as 
unlawful drug use); Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 28–29, 37–39 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting First 
Amendment right for students opposed to abortion rights to distribute rubber fetus dolls to other 
students during school); A.M. ex rel. McCallum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 217, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting challenge to ban on purses bearing Confederate Flag). But see B.H. ex rel Hawk v. Easton 
Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting school ban on bracelets bearing the 
breast-cancer-awareness slogan “I [heart] boobies!”). 
394.  478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
395.  Id. at 683, 685. 
396.  Tinker, 393 U.S at 512–13. 
397.  See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688–90 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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constitutes a unique category for which a school need not show disruption 
to regulate or punish student speakers.398 
Two years later, the Court upheld a school’s authority to control the 
content of a student newspaper produced as part of the school’s 
curriculum.399 Brennan wrote a vigorous dissent that attempted to expand 
the sphere of protected student speech. He wrote in vivid language of 
students “expect[ing] a civics lesson” on operating a forum for expressing 
their ideas and appreciating the rights of journalists under the First 
Amendment; of the principal breaching a promise to those students by 
excising articles without consultation simply because he viewed them as 
inappropriate and unsuitable for student consumption;400 and of the Court, 
in rejecting their claims, teaching precisely the wrong civics lesson.401 He 
decried the principal’s “unthinking contempt for individual rights,” more 
egregious when done by a school official with “whom the public entrusts 
the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the cherished 
democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees.”402 
For Brennan, Tinker provided the appropriate framework, but the 
school made no showing of any actual or substantial risk of disruption.403 
He emphatically refused to accept the majority’s distinction between 
personal speech (subject to Tinker) and school-sponsored speech (subject to 
plenary school control), or the power of a school to restrict speech that the 
school deems incompatible with its pedagogical message.404 “The First 
Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority.”405 
Brennan was particularly incensed by the notion that educators possess 
authority to shield high school students from exposure to potentially 
sensitive topics, unacceptable viewpoints, or conduct “otherwise 
inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order.’”406 The 
problem was “how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage 
viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive 
topics.”407 Brennan even branched into the sarcastic. Responding to the 
majority’s suggestion that the principal intended his actions as a “lesson on 
the nuances of journalistic responsibility,” he pointed out that the principal 
 
398.  B.H., 725 F.3d at 298. 
399.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262, 263–66 (1988). The principal 
objected to and excised two pages of the paper, containing stories on the impact of divorce on students 
and the experiences of several students dealing with pregnancies. See id. 
400.  Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
401.  Id. at 290–91. 
402.  Id. at 290. 
403.  Id. at 280. 
404.  Id. at 280–82. 
405.  Id. at 280. 
406.  Id. at 285 (citations omitted). 
407.  Id. at 288. 
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never consulted the students before censoring their work and did not 
explain his actions in anything but vague generalities, such that “the lesson 
was lost on all but the psychic [paper] staffer.”408 
The final notable student speech case is Island Trees Union Free 
School District v. Pico.409 Brennan wrote a plurality opinion as the Court 
held that a school district violated the First Amendment by removing a 
number of books, several of them classics, from library shelves. As in 
Rosenbloom, finding himself unable to secure a majority, Brennan went off 
on his own (joined only by Thurgood Marshall and Stevens) in a highly 
speech-protective direction. 
Pico reflects several of Brennan’s free-speech ideals, all grounded in 
the uniqueness of libraries as First Amendment institutions. Like all 
libraries, a school library is “a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and 
to beauty” and the locus of student freedom to inquire, study, evaluate, and 
understand.410 It thus was wrong to focus on the “inculcative functions” of 
secondary education or the acknowledged discretion school boards should 
have in transmitting values through the compulsory curriculum.411 Because 
students choose whether to use the library for self-education and individual 
enrichment and they choose what books to read in doing so, the school 
board does not wield the same discretion.412 The unique nature of libraries 
implicated a student’s First Amendment right to receive information and 
ideas, a “necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his 
own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”413 
Brennan thus famously distinguished decisions to purchase and add 
books to the library shelves from decisions to remove books already 
purchased from the shelves, with schools exercising broad discretion as to 
purchasing decisions, but less discretion as to removal decisions. Because 
only the removal power potentially allowed for suppression of ideas, only 
removal was subject to First Amendment limitations against the school 
exercising its power based on dislike for the ideas contained in the 
challenged books.414 
Unfortunately, Brennan’s Pico opinion has gained little traction and 
been largely forgotten, making it arguably his most underrated First 
Amendment opinion.415 In one challenge to removal of a book from the 
shelves of a school library, the Eleventh Circuit insisted that because Pico 
 
408.  Id. at 285. 
409.  457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
410.  Id. at 868 (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (opinion of Fortas, J.)). 
411.  Id. at 869. 
412.  Id. 
413.  Id. at 867. 
414.  Id. at 871–72. 
415.  Thanks to Thomas Baker for suggesting that description. 
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was a plurality, it “is a non-decision so far as precedent is concerned. It 
establishes no standard.”416 
Brennan’s distinction between purchasing and removing books enjoyed 
a brief revival in the early Internet days in controversies over filters on 
public-library computer terminals. Litigants, governments, and courts 
debated whether filtering was analogous to a library removing some online 
material having purchased the entire Internet (in which case Brennan’s 
Pico opinion limited the library’s discretion) or to declining to purchase 
particular online material (in which case library officials were entitled to 
greater discretion). One district court adopted the former analogy in 
holding that filters violated the First Amendment.417 But the Supreme Court 
made virtually no mention of Pico or the purchase-removal distinction in 
upholding a federal statute requiring that all libraries receiving federal 
funds (that is, almost all public libraries) install filters.418 Only David 
Souter (appropriately, Brennan’s successor on the Court) followed 
Brennan’s lead, insisting that filtering Internet content is analogous “either 
to buying a book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable 
‘purpose,’ or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with 
anything thought to be unsuitable for all adults.”419 
CONCLUSION 
By any measure, Holmes and Brennan are two of the driving forces of 
modern free speech law, greatly responsible for its exalted status in the 
constitutional regime. By showing the processes that lead to their two 
greatest First Amendment contributions, The Great Dissent and The 
Progeny illustrate how and why these opinions, and the Justices who wrote 
them, made, and continue to make, their historic contribution. 
 
416.  ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009). 
417.  Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of Loudoun Cnty. Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793–
94 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
418.  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 208 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating 
that, because a library cannot individually evaluate the web sites it chooses, it is permitted to make 
categorical judgments). 
419.  Id. at 237 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
